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A Sandalan ning Katimawan
Reader

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Preface

The following articles were originally published on the WordPress site for Sandalan ning Katimawan from August 2021 to February 2022. They represent the organization's growing maturity in Political Theory, with Paleolibertarian and Neoreactionary themes heavily present. Interactions with fellow Dissident Right travelers, especially Filipinos, informed the articles' writing.

The articles are mostly self-contained by themselves, although one would preferably have a background in History, Economics, Political Theory, and especially Paleolibertarian and Neoreactionary thought to fully appreciate how monumental they are for a Philippine audience. The writer claims to be an academic in the natural sciences, and his purported background shows in his metaphors and other figures of speech. Otherwise, his grasp on History and Political Theory is rather strong, and one could argue that he surpasses most mainline Philippine academics in the humanities.

The first article serves to enlighten readers about the current political order, and slowly introduces Neoreaction. The following articles discuss, critique, and apply Neoreactionary ideas, with an increasing Paleolibertarian bent as they go on. True to the organization's purpose, the Kapampangan lands and peoples have more focus when discussing specific examples of concepts. While the ideas used have been known in Western audiences for a decade, their application in a Philippine context is completely novel.

This compilation serves only as a first volume, for surely the organization will release future articles.

The Editor

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An Ideological Analysis of Philippine Politics

Let your word be Yes for Yes, and No for No; whatever goes beyond this, comes of evil.

Matthew 5:37

One common trend in Philippine politics is the small role that ideology plays. Truly, all political parties pander to no bigger idea than vague platitudes about the “people”. What attracts little attention, however, is that all parties do subscribe to an ideology. This specific one, however, has fallen into obscurity since its main proponent and founder has fallen out of the establishment’s favor.

The Baker’s Home

The characteristic mark of this age of dictators, wars, and revolutions is its anti-capitalistic bias. Most governments and political parties are eager to restrict the sphere of private initiative and free enterprise. It is an almost unchallenged dogma that capitalism is done for and that the coming of all-around regimentation of economic activities is both inescapable and highly desirable.

Fascism was not, as its advocates boasted, an original product of the Italian mind. It began with a split in the ranks of Marxian socialism, which certainly was an imported doctrine. Its economic program was borrowed from German non-Marxian socialism and its aggressiveness was likewise copied from Germans, the *Alldeutsche* or Pan-German forerunners of

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the Nazis. Its conduct of government affairs was a replica of Lenin's dictatorship. Corporativism, its much advertised ideological adornment, was of British origin. The only home-grown ingredient of Fascism was the theatrical style of its processions, shows and festivals.

Ludwig von Mises, *Planned Chaos*

In the 1970s, president Ferdinand Marcos justified his New Society on the basis of Democratic Revolution from the Center. This ideology's main thrust is to use the government as instrument of social change. Marcos trounces Marxist revolutionary thinking, saying that

I can see and appreciate the social and economic good of communism. But I find it difficult to understand how its political society can be called democratic when a single party, the Communist party, or a group of men who control it, has a monopoly of political power. 'The party knows best,' is the simplified dictum of the communist political order.

Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 54

As an alternative, Marcos bases his Revolution off Liberal Revolutionary ideas – a constitutional state admits more people and groups into the establishment, establishes egalitarian ideas, and unites a state under one nation and one spirit. The New Society was the first manifestation of this ideal. Marcos explains seven threats to the New Society,

the Communist revolutionaries, now divided into the "traditionalists" and the "Maoists"; the rightists with their plans for a coup d'etat; the Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao and Sulu (the two main islands which comprise our "southern backdoor"; the private armies and the political warlords, who were actually the power brokers in the old society; the criminal elements, which partly promoted and took advantage of the situation; the oligarchs, who sought by all means to maintain the status quo and were possibly allied with the rightist con-

spirators; and the foreign interventionists, evidence of whose funding was confirmed by the government through banks in Japan, Hong-kong, and the United States of America.

Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 134.

To allay these threats, Marcos proposes wide representation from all societal sectors in a “Technocracy of the People”. While not abolishing private property and wealth, he plans to abolish free enterprise and impose redistributionism to ensure an egalitarian collective:

An oligarchic society may sincerely believe in equality of opportunity, but so long as there is a wide economic gap, the opportunity does not in fact exist. True equality of opportunity begins at the starting line, when a human being is born. This simply means that a few should not be born “with everything” while the many start life with nothing. When we proceed from this premise, everything else follows: the radicalization of society begins.

Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 105.

To that end, business and industry are nationalized. School curricula are standardized and state-mandated. A fictional language, “Pilipino”, is instituted as national language. One country, one spirit under a New Society.

Towards the end of his book, Marcos boasts of the Moro National Liberation Front’s dismantling and government intervention leading to great results in the economy. Hindsight lets us know that the former emerged victorious through the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region’s establishment, and the latter fell prey to the Keynesian fallacy, causing economic collapse in the early 1980s. In the last section, Marcos admits to authoritarianism for the common good. He claims that his grip would remain for as long as the need existed. Like many stagnant economies in need of government intervention, he ordered the Central Bank to print money and pay off debts. The economy collapsed overnight.

People Power as Bread and Circuses

Come Marcos's fall, the new administration promised to return democracy and reform the government. This so-called "People Power Revolution" promised a new order, the Fifth Republic. However, many of Marcos's innovations remained. His political system returned under new names – the only exception being the lack of a prime minister. The national language changed nothing but its first letter, remaining the Manila dialect of Tagalog. The government still exercised its intervention into the Economy, freeing enterprise only for those who could satisfy its countless requirements. The government still tries to incorporate all people under one nation, one spirit, if not under a New Society then under whatever administration rules the country.

No doubt, the establishment remains exactly as it was in the Marcos regime. Paranoia against both right and left-wing subversives remains a hallmark of the Philippine government:

This was the only possible explanation why reactionaries and radicals, rightists and leftists, could get together, as they did, with of course their own respective plans for dealing with the situation. The reactionaries needed the radicals to harass the government with their demonstrations in the cities, and with their armed comrades' terroristic sorties in the countryside.

Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 126-127.

Compare this to Gloria Aquino's justification of the 2006 State of Emergency:

...over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists—the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State—who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspir-

1.3 *The Welfare State's Roots and Present Growth*

acy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004.

Proclamation No. 1017

Compare Cory Aquino's institutionalization of dynastic politics in Philippine municipalities, cities, and provinces to Marcos's cartelization of the Philippine Economy. Compare Fidel Ramos relinquishing control of public utilities to sanctioned monopolies to Marcos's installation of cronies in the exact same companies. We find that the Philippine Establishment looks out only for itself – its political games serve powerful families which have existed since the Philippine Revolution. Elections see contenders with no ideological differences for only one ideology has remained dominant since the Marcos regime. Thus we see welfare subsidies and high taxes – Marcos was a fan of the Scandinavian model. Thus we see little business creation till recently. Thus we see platitudes about integrating social welfare and the market every election. Thus we see each president rattle endlessly about “the people” despite living in comfort and security for all their lives. Liberal, Nacionalista, Marcos, Duterte, Aquino, Arroyo, these labels comprise one motion with a unified telos – Democratic Revolution from the Center. The accidents differ, yet the essence remains.

The Welfare State's Roots and Present Growth

(This section borrows from Bautista, V. Governing the Social Welfare Sector.)

But how did the Philippine welfare state begin? Social welfare played little role in the immediate post-war period – only a single executive office, the Social Welfare Administration, handled the whole country. This office played a more reactive role, with welfare seen as rehabilitative. The Garcia administration began enlarging the office's role, with social security and livelihood programs sprouting. The Marcos administration, however, elevated the Social Welfare Administration to the Department of Social Welfare in 1968. The government now saw itself as the primary caretaker

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of society – neither family, nor community, nor parish mattered compared to the state. Democratic Revolution from the Center necessarily propped up the welfare state as society’s start and end. What more, social welfare was seen as a tool for development, not just rehabilitation. Thus we have the Philippine welfare state’s roots.

Increased state planning and supervision in private matters manifested in the New Society’s Five Year Plans, done in similar vein to the Soviet Union’s. For the second plan in 1978, government-funded social services would be extended unilaterally to the lower 30 percent of the population. The first public-private partnerships also found their origins in the renewed welfare state – the private sector and civil society were seen as tools to allocate state resources. After the Aquino administration took power, the only difference made to the welfare state was an increased priority for women – hence the 1987 Constitution’s specific pandering to female empowerment:

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 14

The emphasis on development remained, however, changing little from the Marcos administration’s policies:

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 10

If any other changes occurred, these were additions and enhancements rather than modifications. The Aquino administration continued public-private partnership in welfare by constitutionally institutionalizing the role of NGOs and “sectoral organizations”:

The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

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1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 23

Aquino's institutionalization of the political dynasties found legal backing in the Local Government Code – municipal, city, and provincial governments received powers to handle matters of social welfare:

Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied there from, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, Section 16

Section 17 of the code details a long list of specific, niche powers allotted to local governments. One may only read it to see how the welfare state has intruded into people's lives: details as trifling as sports stadiums, beautification, multipurpose places, to larger powers like housing projects and infrastructure like jails, parks, hospitals, and the like. The reader may note, however, that executive, legislative, and judiciary powers remain only with the central government. This is how the dynasties became entrenched – paternalist politicians giving the populace bread and circuses through allotted welfare programs, whose definition subsumes broad areas, while important matters are messed up by Manila.

The rest of the code gives nothing but legal nitty-gritty details for execution of Local Government powers. All these, while Manila decides if

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public utilities can form in far-off provinces:

Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws, rules and regulations, there is hereby granted to the RMC Telecommunications Consultants, Inc., hereunder referred to as the grantee, its successors or assigns, a franchise to construct, establish, install, maintain and operate for commercial purposes and in the public interest, local exchange network, including public calling stations or pay telephone stations or wireless local loop and for such purpose provide basic telephone service or other means related to the foregoing now known to science or which in the future may be developed in the Province of Oriental Mindoro, for public domestic telecommunications.

Republic Act No. 8635

Whether utility cooperatives can exist and whether they have done good jobs:

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House of Representatives to commend Pampanga I Electric Cooperative, Inc (PELCO I) for its outstanding performance as an electric cooperative and staying true to its service-oriented mission.

House Resolution No 1593

See also how national government organs think they know better than local governments in handling their locales:

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on Wednesday summoned Pasig City Mayor Vico Sotto for possible violation of Republic Act 11469 or the Bayanihan to Heal as One Act. NBI Deputy Director Ferdinand Lavin said the purpose of the “invitation letter” sent to Sotto is to enable him to explain his side on the allegation that he disobeyed the national government policy in imposing the community quarantine in light of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak. Sotto was re-

1.4 The Cathedral and Freemasonry – a Historical Sidetrack

quired by NBI to submit his explanation on April 7 at 10 in the morning. It was the NBI's Anti-Graft Division that summoned the Pasig City Mayor. Sotto allegedly issues a policy that is in violation of Bayanihan Law's Section 6 (a) for disobeying national government policies or directives in imposing quarantines.

Tetch Torres-Tupas – Reporter, Philippine Daily Inquirer

Marcos's actions empowered Leftist groups despite OPLAN Saggitarius's alleged success. The New People's Army remains a nuisance, having allies in congress and local governments. Islamic separatism has grown stronger, with the city of Marawi seeing a large battle in 2017. The MNLF and MILF have made peace with each other and the national government after the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region's success. The Abu Sayyaf, Jeemayah Islamiyah, Islamic State, and countless other militant groups have all popped up after his fall. What more, the national government allows these groups to exist while ensuring that they cause not too much damage.

After one views all elections in retrospect, he may see that all candidates share more in common than they differ – from ideology to background. In a historical sidetrack, we must discuss the most notable denominator linking top officials and historical figures from the Philippine Revolution.

The Cathedral and Freemasonry – a Historical Sidetrack

These families gained power during the Philippine Revolution. Contrary to popular belief, Andres Bonifacio was a wealthy man who managed to get rich through running a haberdashery. His mentor in La Liga Filipina, Jose Rizal, ran into a land dispute with friars for the Rizal family refused to either pay rent or leave. These land disputes were common among the Tagalog principalia. Bonifacio would gain support from the Tagalog

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middle class to wage a rebellion. Many had flirted with Freemasonry, and the rebels adopted Freemasonic rites and symbols.

Tagalog principales like Emilio Aguinaldo flocked to Bonifacio's cause. A few Kapampangan noblemen like Mariano Llanera, Francisco Macabulos, and Jose Alejandrino also joined. Once the rebellion had grown out of initial Spanish containment, principales in the Visayas and Mindanao pledged allegiance to Aguinaldo. Once more, Freemasonry remains the common denominator between these nobles. The initial Spanish plan to reorganize in the Visayas after an armistice with America gave way to a complete sale of the East Indies. The native principalia attempted to fight America, yet failed for a lack of popular support – see how many Kapampangans joined the US Army.

To alleviate their position, the principalia decided instead to ally with America. War-torn Pampanga saw Tagalogs and Tagalog allies buy plenty of land at low prices, hiring the former owners to work it for them. Former revolutionaries became politicians, agitating for a free commonwealth and eventual independence. The myth of a united Philippine people began emerging. America allowed native politics to run its course for the colony received little popular appeal, and bigger matters remained to solve. Those elected to positions were the same nobles who led the rebellion. Alliances were forged in marriages and deals. Despite no shared land, language, or blood, these new politicians were all brother (and sister) Freemasons. As a side note, Spanish remained the lingua franca despite American support for English – it was far more convenient to use it when dealing in a multiethnic land.

By the late 1950s, Filipino nationalism received a strong boost from Carlos P Garcia. His autarkic policies and strong promotion of Filipino nationhood received support from the likes of Carlos P Romulo. Both names mentioned were again Freemasons. Diosdado Macapagal, another Freemason, furthered this cause by changing the official Independence Day to June 12. Things came to a head when Ferdinand Marcos was

1.4 The Cathedral and Freemasonry – a Historical Sidetrack

elected on the platform to make this country great again. It was under him that nationalism reached its peak – both as its booster and as its target. Towards the end of his reign, locals – including Kapampangans – started referring to themselves as Filipinos rather than their local ethnicity. Local languages fell out of favor for Tagalog.

We thus note that all those in significant positions – the executive, legislative, judiciary, bureaucracy, the police, the military – were initiated into Freemasonry. Little official recognition of this fact exists – only bits and pieces, like Alan Purisima’s membership disclosed during a scandal, or small mentions in the history books. President Aquino wrote congratulatory letters to a Manila lodge, and Sebastian Duterte publicly showed his Freemasonic membership on Instagram. Most notably, Manny Pacquiao joined Freemasonry during the pandemic. This group is well-entrenched in the Philippine elite – what reason do we have to think that any credible opposition may come from within their ranks?

In Neo-reactionary circles, we call this institutionalized power the Cathedral: government and big business collude while progressive social policies are handed out little by little to satisfy the populace. The Philippines is too Catholic for progressive policies, you protest? Despite popular opinion, the Catholic Church’s hierarchy is declawed and neutered – its outcry during the RH Bill debates amounted to almost nothing against the Cathedral’s power. See how little resistance comes from the hierarchy in face of the divorce and SOGIE bills? In the wake of St John Paul II style neo-Catholicism, backlash against Pope Benedict XVI’s allowance of the Traditional Latin Mass, and Pope Francis’s more progressive opinions, the CBCP as a whole will do nothing against the Cathedral – they themselves support it. What little orthodoxy remains either believe themselves to remain in St John Paul II’s time, or have joined the traditionalist movement – both have become fringe movements in face of larger trends.

Balkanization is the only Option

We must face the fact that elections will change nothing, for the Freemasonic elite remain the only candidates. The post-Marcos Establishment retained all but the man himself, in addition to prudent changes that give an illusion of people power. Sometimes this illusion breaks – when Mount Pinatubo erupted in 1991, the American base in Clark did more to help the Kapampangans than the national government. Yet by installing dynasties in each local government, by allowing cronies to directly manage utilities as monopolistic corporations, by promoting Neoclassical and Keynesian economics, by raising the minimum wage every election season, the Manila government presents a tangible blueprint for an authoritarian government to peddle bread and circuses.

The body politic is corrupt, and its head is the cause of infection. And as the head does, the body follows. We must let this body die, and let new states rise from the dust. The Kapampangan people and the land of Pampanga are well-equipped for independence – only Manila, greedy for taxes and tribute, prevents this from happening. We thus urge the Kapampangan people to learn, to study, to exercise, and above all, to pray for salvation and deliverance from Manila's clutches.

True liberty is not when one follows what the body or passions urge. The Tagalog word *kalayaan* comes from *layaw* – to follow the body's wants. True liberty is the ability to choose good and reject evil. Thus the Kapampangan *katimawan* – the ability to act without material interference. Pampanga must restore its original liberty and autonomy which has persisted from precolonial times up to the Revolution. There shall be no Kapampangan Revolution, but a counter-revolution, restoring Pampanga's old institutions, social structures, and economic systems. We shall see free enterprise, the right to property, the Church's role in society, and the nonexistence of corporations restored in due time. Our tools shall be modern technology, science, learning, and scholarship to restore an old Kapampangan nation – the two parts combining to form a new whole,

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different from either the old order or the modern one.

2

Entropy in the Tagalog Worldview

Preface: Entropy Reconsidered

Entropy is. . . often erroneously referred to as the ‘state of disorder’ of a system. Qualitatively, entropy is simply a measure how much the energy of atoms and molecules become more spread out in a process and can be defined in terms of statistical probabilities of a system or in terms of the other thermodynamic quantities.

Entropy. (2020, August 16). Retrieved from <https://chem.libretexts.org/@go/page/1942>

Curtis Yarvin popularized the idea of Leftism as Entropy: a chaotic force leading to society’s destruction. He purports Progressive ideas, including egalitarianism, liberal democracy, feminism, etc to destabilize order in society. The Left’s rationale is to turn lead into gold: solve et coagula, as Traditional Catholics call it. Humanity, imperfect and fallen, is exalted to reach Heaven through scientific progress, through fine-tuned calibration. To counteract this, Yarvin proposes absolutism and neocameralism: a single chief executive beholden to a populace. Like a CEO, he answers to the populace’s demands while exercising full power over the body politic. This iron hand would keep order in society, while ensuring accountability.

Yet as the quote above shows, entropy is not chaos. As reality shows, the Left wants chaos the least. Entropy is the increasing lack of activity, of movement, till the dynamic process reaches equilibrium. This is the Left’s true goal: a static order, no motion, no hierarchies, no divisions, no property, no markets. Indeed, Yarvin’s proposal hearkens more to a Communist Politburo theoretically accountable to the people. Instead of economic matters, a neocameral leadership would micromanage disputes

and cases and enforcement. Yarvin fell to the popular thought of Communism and Capitalism as diametric opposites, while claiming to be above the dichotomy by imposing a neo-medieval order. In fact, this reasoning comes from Marxian historical materialism.

Historical materialism posits that from primitive communism, economic institutions evolved in a series of command economies. Karl Marx borrowed this idea from Adam Smith, whose invisible hand concept refers to this passage:

The rich. . . consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share of all that it produces. In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them. In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for.

Adam Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*

We can rephrase the highlighted passage like so:

2 Entropy in the Tagalog Worldview

From each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution.

Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme

Command economies inevitably lead to disaster, for no government can gather all the information required. Of course, the Leftist logos pleads to advances in big data and statistics to let governments play God. Pure matter, however, is aimless and formless. Statistical models cannot replicate concrete reality's complexity without human guidance. Aristotle knew that reality and being necessitates doing – to be is to do, and a subject's identity is its being-at-work: a moment's completion of motion. To remain existent is being-at-work-staying-itself: to remain in some active condition persistently towards some end. Life is a dynamic process, with no equilibrium till death. Homeostasis requires full action of each body's organs, not stasis. As such, spontaneous order occurs once members of the body work together in one unified telos, or damla in Kapampangan.

The body politic is the product of spontaneous order. Individuals and families join together to defend their interests as a group. Their affairs are separate from others unless a matter concerns them both. Aristotle thus proposes a political regime – combination of oligarchy and democracy – to rule realms and domains. These same political regimes act with no outside interference. Medieval times, while subscribing to Neoplatonist Metaphysics, worked this practical ideal more than any time throughout history. Yarvin errs in rejecting spontaneous order as modernity's solution, for artificial constructs like limited-liability corporations, centralized states, and dictators would never see light of day in Medieval times.

In medieval times, free cities, universities, mercantile associations, large estates, etc. developed their own systems of governance as more or less closed (private) economies (households or associations of households). They did so under the protection of the Church. The Church was as eager to stop the centralizing drift toward “the absoluteness of political power and

the worship of the might of the mighty” as kings and monarchs were eager to promote it. In addition, the Church’s insistence on the natural law kept those “private systems” compatible with each other as to basic principles and prevented them from turning into separate collections of special-interest privileges. To use a market analogy, the Church oversaw the integrity of the market system without interfering in the internal ordering of individual households or associations of households, at least in so far as they did not threaten to take over the market by forcefully eliminating the independence of other households or to subvert the authority of the principles of natural law.

Frank van Dun, in correspondence to Richard Storey

As such, the Scholastics upheld insurrection against tyranny, private arms-bearing, and tyrannicide, all within proper reason and prudence. Absolute force and power were foreign concepts to Medieval Western and Central Europe. Luther’s Reformation, touted by Yarvin to be a force for disorder, actually aided Early Modern states gain absolute control.

When the delicate balances of customary rights and obligations were disturbed, a new class of politicians and lawyers emerged. Politicians were experts at brokering deals between the ruling elite or its officers and wealthy subjects (cities, landowners, entrepreneurs, traders, adventurers, pirates). Lawyers, trained at the universities in the formal techniques of the Roman Law, were experts at exploiting the weaknesses of the unwritten customary laws in confrontations with formally attested documents, especially those issued by or attributed to one or other king, duke or city government.

The lawyers were always eager to prompt rulers, parliaments and courts of law to favor the class interests of their clients by downplaying their largely unwritten customary duties and obligations as owners of large estates and highlighting their

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usually well-documented property rights to the estates they had bought (often at bargain prices, because many estates had been ruined or vacated in the plagues and wars that devastated the continent between the mid-14th and the mid-17th century). In this way, the lawyers invented “absolute rights”, i.e. rights without obligations, other than those which were owed to the monarch. Such rights could be fitted easily into the conceptual schemes of the academic Roman Law.

Just as the Roman *paterfamilias* was supposed to have had absolute rights over his household against everybody else, except against the Emperor, just so the modern owner’s estate should be supposed his absolute right, subject only to the State’s authority. Politicians and lawyers came to dominate in what remained of the medieval representative

The so-called Protestant Reformation added the notion that everything that had to do with the Catholic Church was part of a past that could not be forgotten soon enough. It was not a reformation so much as it was a cultural revolution. Specifically in its early Lutheran manifestation, the Reformation extended man’s biological individuality into the spheres of his spiritual and intellectual life, and from there, into all his economic, social, political and cultural activities. The extension made the laws of physical force the only Laws of Nature. By implication, only modern empirical “natural science” could constitute the human conscience (“knowledge shared in common”). Everything else was contingent and incidental, merely subjective or conventional fluff. Elaborated in the Enlightenment, those implications rose to prominence in the scientific and technocratic cults of the 19th and the 20th century.

Frank van Dun, *Uprooted Liberalism and its Discontents*

Absolute monarchs like Louis XIII expanded their power by appointing al-

lies in the merchant class to govern formerly autonomous areas. The customary parliaments, hailed by Machiavelli as preserving social order, lost their powers to an increasingly bureaucratic elite. The Protestant wrecking of the social order culminated in the Peace of Westphalia, when centralized states became a reality. Dictators and absolute monarchs shielding humans from their imperfections in fact comes from Enlightenment thinking:

Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, the older libertarian liberalism got buried under an avalanche of liberationism, fed by enthusiasts from all over the political spectrum, eventually even within the Catholic Church. Libertarianism stands for man's capacity as a person to free his will, his thinking and his conscience from error and sin by conscientiously seeking truth in all things — the medieval conception of free will. In contrast, liberationism stands for the State's (or organized society's) capacity to shield individuals from the consequences of their imperfections, errors and sins. By the end of the century, one could well ask "Who needs old-style rights, freedoms and liberties, when everybody has 'human rights', i.e. desires that the State will try to satisfy, if it has the means to do so and deems them politically correct?" Liberationism goes back, on the one hand, to late-medieval, early-modern millenarian movements that sought to create the Kingdom of God (the New Jerusalem of the Bible's Book of Revelation) here on Earth, and on the other hand, to 18th- and 19th-century socialist proposals to undo history and to re-form human society on entirely new foundations.

Frank van Dun, Uprooted Liberalism and its Discontents

Hence, not only does the managerial welfare state find its roots in Enlightenment Liberationism. Limited-liability corporations, absolute monarchs, dictators, and micromanaging human authorities all find their origins in

the Enlightenment. Yarvin's desire to institute absolute chief executives will only worsen the Enlightenment's effects – unless this is the so-called Dark Enlightenment he seeks.

The Tagalog Connection

Despite all post-war Philippine presidents (except Estrada) not being Tagalogs, they have only spread Tagalog culture and language. As we have discussed previously, the Manila establishment's institution of a welfare state suits the collective elite's interests. However, closer examination of Tagalog culture and society gives further answers.

Before Spanish times, Tagalog society was organized in a strict caste system. Juan de Plascencia records four castes: a managerial, non-productive caste of *maginoo*, a warrior caste of *maharlika*, a serf caste of *aliping namamahay*, and chattel slaves called *aliping sa gigilid*. Only the *maginoo* caste was truly free: *maharlika* needed to render agricultural or military service, *aliping namamahay* needed to pay tribute to their masters. Caste mobility was virtually nonexistent, although *alipin* of both types may pay to become *maharlika*, also called *timawa* from Kapampangan influence for they were more free than *alipin*.

This organization descended from the Visayan caste system. Indeed, the Tagalogs had come from the Southern Visayas near Mindanao before migrating northwards to Marinduque and Luzon. The Visayans organized themselves into *datu*, *timawa*, *horo-han*, *oripun*. Unlike the Tagalogs, however, the *datu* and *timawa* had almost fraternal relations. Indeed, Plascencia records Tagalog *maginoo* acting paternalistically to their *maharlika*: holding feasts and banquets for their benefit before going into battle. Visayan *datu* and *timawa*, however, acted more like a Germanic *comitatus*. A *timawa* retinue and their *datu* watched each other's back, tasted the other's wine for poison, checked on each other's relatives, and so on. Serf *horo-han* served military service only, becoming *timawa* through loyal service. Chattel *uripon* were treated as the lowest of soci-

ety. Tagalog society thus saw a shift in the warrior caste being relegated to soldiers and farmers, while Visayan warriors fought and farmed in their own right without obligation. Scott notes that both datu and timawa were non-productive castes for society at large, uripon performing most of the work.

Tagalog society presents a clear contrast with Kapampangan society. Ruling Guinu had rights and obligations to enforce custom and judge cases: nothing more. Guinu were elected by popular acclamation, and hereditary succession was not guaranteed. Larkin notes that other than these duties, guinu and freemen timawa were little different. Both groups needed to work their land or craft goods for sale, and timawa tributes were required only once a year as taxes. Guinu could also lead war parties of timawa who enlist. Chattel slavery was virtually non-existent, with the ipus servants an exact equivalent to European serfdom. Much important to the Kapampangans was catimawan: *libertas* in the Medieval sense. Indeed, the Tagalog word *kalayaan* was a neologism coined from *layaw*: to spoil the body with concupiscence. Kapampangan concepts of property, markets, production, and consumption were rather advanced for Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Kapampangan society saw that timawa receive fair trial from a council. Guinu could be tried only by guinu from other villages to prevent familial and kinship ties from imposing bias.

Tagalog culture's attractiveness for the Manila establishment surely stems from the Tagalogs' entropic worldview. Tagalogs are a non-confrontational people, who prefer peace with neighbors. Arguments and quarrels stem from non-conformity, as the inaccurately named crab mentality shows: the proud nail in Tagalog cultures is hammered down. Indeed, Kapampangans along the Pampanga River know that crabs, when placed in a bucket, aid each other in getting out. Tagalogs have projected their own impropriety on the rest of the ethnic tribes in an attempt to impose conformity and uniformity. Tagalog songs, Tagalog literature, Tagalog heroes are now imposed as "national" songs, literature, and heroes.

2 Entropy in the Tagalog Worldview

This trait has been recorded from Spanish times:

They act tyrannically one toward another. Consequently, the Indian who has some power from the Spaniard is insolent and intolerable among them—so much so that, in the midst of their ingratitude, some of them recognize it, although very few of them. Yet it is a fact that, if the Spaniards had not come to these islands, the Indians would have been destroyed; for, like fish, the greater would have swallowed the lesser, in accordance with the tyranny which they exercised in their paganism.

Gaspar de San Agustin, in correspondence

This proud-nail mentality inhibits enterprise and business among Tagalogs. The collective traditionally obeys the whims of a woman-leader, or dayang. Tagalog matriarchy has been a noted fact in history:

The major aim of a Tagalog marriage was to provide the wife with a groom rather than a groom with a wife. In other words, Tagalog society was organized for women, men being necessary accessories. This is contained in the terms [for state of engagement and state of marriage] both derived from the root “female”. . . Moreover, in the case of the aristocracy, the wife being a ginoo “dame, noble lady” by marriage the groom became a maginoo “lord, a man having a dame”. This ancient status of the wife is somehow reflected in modern Tagalog by the term maybahay “wife, having a house”.

Jean-Paul Potet, *Ancient Beliefs and Customs of the Tagalogs*
pp 80–81

While men still led Tagalog society, women held it together, and often informed their spouses' policies. Indeed, the male maginoo acted more as bureaucrats and managers for their wives and concubines. Tagalog society encouraged drunkenness, promiscuity, and affairs. Abortion and infanticide, while practiced, was not as rampant in precolonial Visayas for

the Tagalogs loved large families. Indeed, affairs with future sisters-in-law were regular premarital occurrences.

Kapampangan society was not as licentious. Quoting Gaspar de San Agustin,

The Pampangos can be exempted from this rule, for they are very temperate in this wretched habit [of drunkenness], as well as in all the other things which we have mentioned. They are very different: for they are truthful, and love their honor; are very brave, and inclined to work; and are more civil, and of better customs. In regard to the vices here mentioned (for they are, in the last analysis, Indians like the rest), they keep them more out of sight and covered. In all things the Pampangos have a nobleness of mind that makes them the Castilians of these same Indians. Consequently, that people must be distinguished from the rest in its character, in all that we have said.

Gaspar de San Agustin, in correspondence

Kapampangan nobleness speaks for itself in historical records: Kapampangans garrisoned Spanish outposts as far as Cebu and the Ladrões. Kapampangan arquebusiers fought against the Dutch. Kapampangan dragoons and infantry formed the vanguard against British aggression. Kapampangans formed a unique officer corps in the East Indies forces. Kapampangan nobility entered the Spanish peerage. Kapampangan students went to Spain for studies.

The Kapampangan-Tagalog divide has existed from prehistory, as previously discussed. Thus when Apung Sucu led his forces against the Tagalog navy under Dayang Makiling, one could discern Providence playing Maxwell's Demon: entropy was reversed, and the Kapampangan way of life persisted. Indeed, one may see the Tagalog slur of dugong aso as envy. Kapampangan boastfulness may be Tagalog collectivism and conformity picking on the individualist Kapampangans. We thus turn to another

2 Entropy in the Tagalog Worldview

product of envy, which has ecclesiastical condemnation:

To remedy these wrongs the socialists, working on the poor man's envy of the rich, are striving to do away with private property, and contend that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that by thus transferring property from private individuals to the community, the present mischievous state of things will be set to rights, inasmuch as each citizen will then get his fair share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their contentions are so clearly powerless to end the controversy that were they carried into effect the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. They are, moreover, emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the community.

Rerum Novarum, paragraph 4

Envy for better peers marks Tagalog society. The proud-nail mentality ensures conformity among a docile, woman-lead populace. Megacorporations and bureaucratic regimes mark Tagalog lands, with free enterprise and markets dead in the water. Freedom of voluntary association dies, and one must be a "Filipino", or an "Atenean", or a "Lasallian", or a "UP Fighter", or the proud tool of whatever corporation, or the proud graduate of whatever school. Kapampangan businessmen remain successful, with or without government backing through limited liability or kickbacks. Kapampangan enterprises dominate Pampanga and Tarlac, with the odd outsider store here and there – most probably in Clark, Angeles, or San Fernando. Kapampangans see disaster and tragedy as a challenge, and learn from their mistakes to improve themselves. A Tagalog sees progress as walking backwards while looking backwards. If Mount Makiling erupted, Tagalog lands would remain desolate for decades. Meanwhile, Pampanga recovered practically overnight from Mount Pinatubo with little govern-

ment support. Kapampangans whom Tagalogs berate as muck farmers have grown rich through agribusiness and sheer diligence. What more for the technically skilled Kapampangans?

Ultracalvinism as Tagalog State Religion

Curtis Yarvin posits that 21st century democracies hold Ultracalvinism as their state religion. Although a theoretical concept with no self-proclaimed adherents, the Ultracalvinist framework provides a good study on Tagalog society. We list each main point as Yarvin states below, and follow up with a comparison on Tagalog culture.

First, ultracalvinists believe in the universal brotherhood of man. As an Ideal (an undefined universal) this might be called Equality. (“All men and women are born equal.”) If we wanted to attach an “ism” to this, we could call it fraternalism.

The Tagalogs hold to equality among them within Tagalog society, and among them and other ethnic groups. Conformity and collectivism, the proud nail mentality, and non-confrontationalism outside of proud nails are blatant displays of this fact. Tagalog matriarchy is only one manifestation of this, for man’s natural strengths are equalized and redistributed by placing them on woman’s feet.

Second, ultracalvinists believe in the futility of violence. The corresponding ideal is of course Peace. (“Violence only causes more violence.”) This is well-known as pacifism.

Tagalogs abhor confrontation (again, outside of nailing down proud nails) and use of violence to solve problems. Violent cinema and video games were anathema to Tagalogs, although youths exposed to Western media have changed stances on this point.

Third, ultracalvinists believe in the fair distribution of goods. The ideal is Social Justice, which is a fine name as long as we remember that it has nothing to do with justice in the dictio-

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nary sense of the word, that is, the accurate application of the law. (“From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.”) To avoid hot-button words, we will ride on a name and call this belief Rawlsianism.

As women historically lead Tagalog societies, so too would society look like a household run by a smothering mother. Tagalogs inherently support redistribution, envying their betters such as Kapampangans. Tagalog support for strongmen and for progressive stances seem at odds unless one knows of Ultracalvinism. Unquestioned managerial elites use progressive policies as prolefeed while civil liberties erode away.

Fourth, ultracalvinists believe in the managed society. The ideal is Community, and a community by definition is led by benevolent experts, or public servants. (“Public servants should be professional and socially responsible.”) After their counterparts east of the Himalaya, we can call this belief mandarism.

Entropy seeks stasis and security. Tagalogs would rather work for a corporation or bureaucracy than strike on their own as a sole proprietorship or independent contractor. Kapampangans bear all the risk of their investments, and pay or profit accordingly. Tagalogs, however, would have their cake and eat it too, and will use any trick to offload risk on their actions.

As one sees, Ultracalvinism is the de facto state religion for Tagalogs. In fact, Philippine Catholicism at the hierarchy’s level remains greatly influenced by Tagalog culture and society. A sharp turn to liberation theology, support for the *nouvelle theologie*, a greater emphasis on social justice than proper, orthodox catechism emerged from Tagalog cultural and societal hegemony over the Philippines. Kapampangan clergy, who used to fill the ranks of Jesuits and Augustinians, have unfortunately imitated their Tagalog counterparts in some aspects. We thus request prayer and penance for Kapampangan clergy and religious that they may return to their proper path.

The Tagalog vision of entropy sees them dominating the Archipelago de San Lazaro through the myth of a united Filipino people. Tagalog matriarchy, conformity, and collectivism have all reappeared as Feminism and Democratic Revolution from the Center. We Kapampangans need to fight these foreign values to preserve our way of life.

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Appendix: Neoreactionary Caste Analysis for the Philippines

The term caste, while having connotations of rigid, Indian/Confucian social organization, nonetheless remains useful for analyzing Philippine society for its heavy use in Neoreactionary discussion. Indeed, the Philippines has already seen organization into separate castes similar to Curtis Yavin's treatment of America. As always, caste organization in the Philippines has unique attributes from its history, demographics, and other relevant factors.

BDH: Socially left

- **Principales:** formerly referring to the nobility under Spanish rule, the subject and purpose of principales have changed somewhat. This caste comprises oligarchical politicians, industrialists, and corporate magnates devoted to Democratic Revolution from the Center. The principales' goals have been treated elsewhere.
- **Academia:** the academic caste, concentrated around the Big Four universities, and by extension the UP System countrywide. This caste comprises professors, graduate students, and other armchair political analysts who air vague notions about bayan, bansa, and other Tagalog terms. Although ignored by most people, the academic caste remains a potent force for policy and political action.
- **Managers-Professionals:** bachelor degree holders, may or may not be PRC licensed. Their main aim is to rise up corporate ranks and advance their career. Most managers-professionals subscribe to socially progressive viewpoints, while partaking in mass consumption. As such, these types progress environmentalism while helping degrade the environment. This caste typically knows a smidgen of theoretical concepts, learned from the academic caste, then uses it as backing for their views.

2.5 Appendix: Neoreactionary Caste Analysis for the Philippines

- Communists and sympathizers: not a proper caste in itself, for they are drawn from the above castes. While a minority among the population, Communism represents either a boogeyman or end-goal depending on who is asked. The communist insurgency has shifted from a primarily military to political-social conflict. As such, the CPP-NPA has supporters in Congress, Academia, and manager-professionals. As such, they use Capitalist tools to further their agenda – branding, PR, promotion typical of corporations peddling Socialist and Communist messages.

Swing castes

- The military: high command of the AFP is firmly in the principalia. Junior officers have more authoritarian-right tendencies. Enlisted personnel, however, enlist for stable income and security.
- The Church hierarchy and laity: clergymen and bishops remain entrenched in St John Paul II-era Philippine Catholicism, with pre-Vatican II aesthetics and orthodox Novus Ordo liturgy. This status quo, however, has begun slipping little by little. The charismatic movement has gained strength. The nouvelle theologie has become the main school taught in schools and colleges. Worst of all, liberation theology and modernist teaching has begun gaining popularity. A bishop saying Mass even discussed the notion of multiplication of loaves and fish being a metaphor for sharing – the exact modernism condemned in *Pascendi Dominici Gregis*. Social welfare in the Tagalog vein has become a priority for the Church hierarchy. The Traditional Latin Mass in Manila is infested with Leftist and Progressive thought.

OV: Economically right

These castes would protest left-wing economic policies in the Philippines. Socially progressive policies, however, are another issue entirely.

- Farmer cooperatives: despite the Left's insistence of a semi-feudal regime in the Philippines, most farmers have self-organized into cooperatives. These groups have allowed stable lives and harvests for farmers across the country. Typically, local governments subsidize these cooperatives with machinery and livestock. In return, these cooperatives allow local dynasties to continue ruling.
- Small businesses: unincorporated small businesses in the Philippines range from sari-sari store owners to parlors and barbershops to eatery owners and cooks to independent consultants. This caste represents the largest subset of the Philippine economy in terms of number – 1/3 of the economy relies on this caste and the next. Over 15 million remain in the so-called informal sector, while others have formally registered with the government. The government usually ignores their existence as long as they stay out of corporate magnates' way and obtain a mayor's permit. The Duterte administration embarked on a program to give cheap loans to prospective small businesses, the biggest pro-small business policy done by the Philippine government.
- SMEs: incorporated small and medium businesses ranging from agribusiness to industry. Nascent competitors to principalia corporations, the BIR targets them the most for tax evasion and tax fraud.

Tipping the Balance: Kapampangan Counterrevolution against the Center

Kapampangan sectors of the right-wing and swing castes need to be persuaded and propagandized to seek independence. Kapampangan Catholicism remains orthodox against liberation and modernist theology—a few

2.5 Appendix: Neoreactionary Caste Analysis for the Philippines

pushes here and there can turn them into traditionalism. Kapampangan enlisted personnel need to be propagandized with pro-Kapampangan messaging. Dissidents from left-leaning castes need to be encouraged.

Sandalan ning Katimwan hosts several resources for a Kapampangan Counterrevolutionary Vanguard to form. We encourage prospective vanguardists to pray, study, hope, exercise, and wait.

3

Viewing the Manila Establishment through Elite Theory

The citizen of Oceania is not allowed to know anything of the tenets of the other two philosophies, but he is taught to execrate them as barbarous outrages upon morality and common sense. Actually the three philosophies are barely distinguishable, and the social systems which they support are not distinguishable at all.

The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism

Elite theory views liberal democracies with suspicion, placing the real source of power to corporate executives, think-tank heads, and lobbying groups. Elections in this viewpoint are a sham to deceive the populace, with elected leaders scapegoats for the unelected elites. Indeed, despite the Philippines adopting elections for leadership succession, a select few with similar backgrounds and interests more often than not gets elected. One may take apart the Manila Establishment to see its inner workings and machinations, all conforming to Elite Theoretical concepts.

The Iron Law of Oligarchy

The essence of oligarchical rule is not father-to-son inheritance, but the persistence of a certain world-view and a certain way of life, imposed by the dead upon the living. A ruling group is a ruling group so long as it can nominate its successors. The Party is not concerned with perpetuating its blood but with perpetuating itself. Who wields power is not important, provided that the hierarchical structure remains always

the same.

Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism

The elite's formation rests in the so-called Iron Law of Oligarchy – organizations which grow large enough need centralized power and authority to maintain cohesion. This centralization manifests in institutionalized bureaucracy and specialization – organization members delegate command to a select few, who divide leadership roles among themselves in different departments. However, this select few inevitably accumulate more power than the governed body despite their election. The members as a whole meet only sometimes, like in elections. Leaders, however, are in constant contact to make plans, carry out programs, and iron out disagreements. These may happen in private personal negotiations, behind the scenes of session meetings and conventions. But since the leaders operate in close contact with each other, out of the sight of the general membership, they tend to develop their own ways of looking at things. As such, they hand-pick new leaderships who have similar worldviews and interests to carry their goals.

Eventually, however, a leadership develops values at odds with membership at large. Ordinary members may take an interest in the organization from time to time, but otherwise the organization is not the center of their lives. However, powerful leaderships may receive salaries and prestige from their role. They seek stability, entropy, and complete risk and danger aversion. Organizational cohesion becomes their prime motivation. Short-sighted comfort-seeking behavior soon brings them into conflict with members. Prime examples are union leaders who mingle too much with corporate executives, socialist deputies sitting with sons of powerful men. Removing corrupted leaderships becomes hard for leaderships retain monopolies of power, authority, and sometimes even force. Most damagingly, leaderships are better organized and equipped for their status merits their position in the first place.

To escape the Iron Law, Adolf Gasser proposes five points to maintain

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cohesion and competition in society:

- Society has to be built up from bottom to top. As a consequence, society is built up by people, who are free and have the power to defend themselves with weapons.
- These free people join or form local communities. These local communities are independent, which includes financial independence, and they are free to determine their own rules.
- Local communities join together into a higher unit e.g. a canton.
- There is no hierarchical bureaucracy.
- There is competition between these local communities e.g. on services delivered or on taxes.

Parallels pop up throughout history. The fall of Carolingian centralization saw contracts be drawn between local rulers, their respective populaces, rulers seeking alliances, communities and bodies. The Body Politic consisted of private law societies, each with its own bylaws and rules. These managed their own affairs, with higher authorities managing relations between private law societies. Gasser's solution was alive and well, though with its inevitable drawback of small-scale conflict ever present. Hence an oligarchy started forming after half a millenium, for kingdoms centralized, wished to reserve armed force to kings, and sought out greater power for the state. This oligarchy first manifested as hereditary knighthood – lifetime obligations to military service for land or pay – in France, non-English Norman kingdoms, and elsewhere. Only kings there could make knights out of no one. Eventually this became a meritocratic bureaucracy drawn from the merchant class, who usurped traditional localist policies outside of royal capitals. In France, this meritocratic bureaucracy supplanted royal power entirely in the French Revolution, and kept a strong sway throughout the 19th century. Other European monarchies saw similar events, with “enlightened absolutism” the norm till constitutional reforms swept them. This “enlightened absolutism” was Napoleon before Napoleon: a benevolent centralized authoritarian state keeping the populace docile through

stability and entropy.

Gasser's solution again manifests in the United States of America's founding. Thirteen American countries wished to band in Confederation for mutual defense and customs. The oligarchy there began with the American Constitution, which bound the American States perpetually in a Federation, instead of a Confederation where secession was an option. This oligarchy gained power in the late 19th century – even as anti-monopoly laws broke up corporations, these bodies became the precursor to keiretsu style cartels in Japan by keeping close links between the new broken up corporations.

The Philippine State, however, was founded in a top-bottom manner by an originally Tagalog elite. Andres Bonifacio infamously declared all Filipinos as Tagalogs, and imposed his own culture and heritage on the rest of the islands. His envisioned independent state he called Katagalugan (we have discussed elsewhere why Tagalog culture remains attractive to Philippine elites). The people were declared from the beginning – even simple bows and arrows remain under heavy regulation today.

What more, Philippine municipalities are divided in a top-bottom manner, rather than let people congregate in their own communities. These municipalities rely on the capitol, and to a certain extent IRA contributions from Manila. Local government subdivisions remain entrenched in hierarchical bureaucracy, with the state forcing a monopoly on public goods and services – communal, private, and cooperative ownership of these pose competition on state administration. Public-private partnerships present a way for the state to favor selected cronies in business – see the MRT-3's monopoly on the EDSA railways, and the government's refusal to either build more or allow citizen-led initiatives to do so.

As such political participation is limited to those with resources, connections, and popularity to do so. Mike Pangilinan summarizes this order like so:

In the Philippines, power is divided between the nobles of

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Manila who form the Senate and the nobles of the provinces who form Congress. A provincial nobleman may join the ranks of the Senate if he makes Manila his political arena. The common people meanwhile form nothing. They are mere stooges voting for one nobleman against the other, thinking that these nobles give a damn about their welfare.

Siuala deng Meangubie

Being welcome in Manila's arena has three marks:

- Exposure and promotion in mass media
- Large sums of wealth and connections
- Initiation into Freemasonry

One example is Manny Pacquiao. He had long exposure in mass media for his boxing career. He had also accumulated wealth and connections from doing such. Most telling of all, however, was his initiation into Freemasonry last April 2021. This cemented his status as someone who was fully-equipped to take on Manila's political arena.

Freemasonry is the most undervalued yet most impactful of the three marks. Jesse Robredo needed Freemasonic connections in the PNP to cement his role as DILG head.

[Adit] Rentoy's promotion as well as those of the other officers was based on the recommendation made by Interior Secretary and National Police Commission (Napolcom) Chair Jesse Robredo and PNP Chief Director General Jesus Verzosa. Robredo's and Verzosa's recommendation was in turn based on the evaluation of the PNP Senior Officers Placement and Promotion Board (SOPPB).

"Euro-general" officer now a "general"

Paolo Duterte proudly displayed his Freemasonic allegiance on social media. The Davao vice-mayor even displayed images of Manila Establishment heroes Jose Rizal, Antonio Luna, Andres Bonifacio, and Marcelo del

Pilar in city hall for a time in place of his father, the president Rodrigo Duterte.

We can never fail to mention Noynoy Aquino's links, those of his cabinet, among many, many others. We leave a more thorough compilation of Freemasonic links with the Philippine government to someone more willing to compile such.

The Main Thrust of Elite Theory

Elite theory comprises seven main points, to which we can compare the situation in Manila, and by extension the rest of the Philippine State.

Progress is largely an illusion, Democracy is impossible, though useful as a myth to deceive the masses.

While the likes of Japan and South Korea have been touted as “robust democracies”, these states have fallen prey to the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Japan has the zaibatsu and later keiretsu, South Korea has the *chaebol*. Both comprise economic elites in their own countries, influencing government policy and lobbying for privileges. Their political counterpart is a bureaucracy, unelected. A similar case holds in the Philippines, where an oligarchic cartel holds sway over several industries with bureaucratic assent. Public goods and services like expressways, ports, railways, and the like have attracted private control and maintenance with little anti-monopoly oversight. The government inevitably refuses to allow citizen-led initiatives, despite nominally being a democracy. Electric cooperatives, like those in Pampanga, need assent from the legislature to operate. Many of these cooperatives see bad performance for little competition exists – little competition exists since too much paperwork needs filing in Congress for them to exist.

Society is inevitably ruled by oligarchs who hold their position by means of force and fraud, and whose sole objective is power—no revolution means more than a change of rulers.

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Leaderships have no incentive to rule beyond what skin in the game they have. The man in Manila has no incentive to make life better for the man in Sulu other than vague notions of Filipino solidarity and concrete items like taxpayer money. A president who does have such an intention out of kindheartedness still falls prey to having little information of the situation of Sulu in the first place. No one should expect a Kapampangan to dictate Cebuano matters, nor a Cebuano on Kapampangan matters. This fiction of a Philippine identity has partly allowed an out-of-touch oligarchy to take power.

Dynasties remain an attractive option for local electorates for they have more skin in the game than national candidates – dynasties have long-term goals and benefits to staying in power, and the land's and people's well-being forms part of that. Thus some dynasties, like the Pineda and Nepomuceno clans in Pampanga, prioritize their local areas' development. Progress happens, however, only until the dynasties' benefit. Thus political violence remains a reality in Pampanga, despite the province's prosperity. Dynastic rule, however, has seen much greater strides than rule from Manila ever has. Dynastic rule began under Cory Aquino's reign, and will end once matters have worsened that stability under dynastic rule collapses. A new dynasty, however, will reign unless the people collectively institutionalize safeguards against it. Abuse of rule and power by oligarchs is easily stumped by an armed and able populace, ready to overthrow bad rulers and safeguard good ones.

Man, as a political animal, is moved solely by selfish motives, except so far as he is under the influence of myths.

Man is naturally expected to choose his family, his friends, and his community over vague notions of “the country” or “the nation”. Collectivist trends among Manila Tagalogs are the exact opposite of the democracy they want – forcing voting and registration despite democracy entailing one being able not to do so, forcing conformist measures among the populace, among others. We have written at length regarding why Tagalogs

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are susceptible to this – these measures benefit them above other ethnic groups. Selfish motives are good insofar as they harm no one including the doer – selfless motives often have hidden agenda behind them.

As such, Federalism sounds selfish for individual provinces – taxes in wealthier provinces mostly stay with them – yet will benefit everyone in the long run – poorer provinces either need to use comparative advantages, fix their institutions/culture, elect better officials, or disband and merge with other provinces. Centralization sounds selfless – taxes from wealthier provinces go to poorer ones – yet often causes harm – the same policies are applied everywhere without thought or discretion, wealthier provinces are held back by a strong tax burden, prosperity is heavily reliant on Manila rather than local factors. The influence of myths – a united Philippine state, the need for a strong, centralized bureaucracy, secession being a sin – causes irrational action among actors.

Conscious, planned action for the community's good is impossible, since each group will try and secure its own advantage.

Kapampangan voting patterns differed heavily from neighboring Tagalog provinces until Martial Law – government-sponsored ethnic reeducation caused Pampanga to align with Tagalog provinces later on. Regionalism remains a cardinal sin among nationalists in Manila, ignoring the reality that people are different and will adopt local cultures and institutions over foreign ones. Top-bottom multicultural policies en masse inevitably lead to each culture's destruction, as we saw with Tagalog/Philippine culture destroying local ones. Top-bottom multiculturalism itself often serves those making it rather than its targets. Organic multiculturalism is the product of human action responding to environmental factors – see the Magyars adopting Western European values and customs while retaining their language and horse mastery – and not shoddy half-baked attempts at diversity .

Politics is, and can be nothing but, a struggle for power.

Political parties form ostensibly for ideology, but nothing is stopping par-

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ties forming solely for in-group preference and interest. We see this plainly in Philippine politics – several parties form with nothing but in-group preference in mind. Some would detest this and prefer a two-party system, not knowing that this would simply distill the situation to its core – politics is a struggle for power among groups with different interests.

What many don't know is that this is a good thing – competition among ideas and opinions allows alternatives among voters. The problem lies in one group becoming too powerful as to dominate the rest. Elites inevitably prefer their own over the others, and kindhearted oligarchs get sidetracked, passed over, or even made scapegoats and puppets. The Philippine president is just one man, who is not even on top of the institution he supposedly governs. Most power resides in the bureaucracy and cartels – the president is their mouthpiece, and serves as a convenient fall guy for bad policies. The elites propped up Duterte over Aquino for bad policies under the latter's reign had tarnished his credibility. Now that the former has seen his own share of controversy, we see a supposed conflict between Robredo and Marcos – the former a convenient fallback to Aquino's status quo, the latter an acceleration in the Cathedral's plans. We warn the reader not to side with either, for both are simply pawns and puppets for the Establishment to use. The fact that mindless debates and arguments have occurred despite little difference in either's viewpoints or policies simply point to this "conflict" being a mere show – and an effective one at that.

Human equality, human fraternity are empty phrases.

The French Revolution believed in positive rights and liberty, the American Revolution in negative rights and liberty. The Tagalog rebels took after the former's viewpoint and mindset and promptly spread their worldview – formalized as Democratic Revolution from the Center by the Marcos regime – throughout the country. The Americans hated such ideas and overthrew the First Republic. However, internal tension in America prevented American rule from concretely establishing itself. The Cathedral

3.2 *The Main Thrust of Elite Theory*

would first form in the American period – wealthy elites becoming leaders despite ostensibly free elections. We thus note that human equality is nonsense – men are built for different things than women, institutions, decisions, and disaster cause poverty and inequality, and so on. Even more nonsensical is human fraternity – Tagalogs and Kapampangans have such different cultures and mindsets, that only the destruction of both can cause the two to become brothers at large.

All moral codes are idealistic conceptions of politics, all visions of a better society are simply lies, intentional or not, covering the naked struggle for power.

Utopianism began in late Medieval and Early Modern times, wishing to see the City of God brought down to man. However, the sacred can never intermingle with the profane. Utopia will never be a reality until the problem of scarcity is solved – and it never will. Instead, man has to struggle, to suffer, and to learn from his mistakes, for lead can never be turned to gold without an equivalent exchange. Hence why Christ suffered and died a shameful death, that He may lift man to Heaven through the straight and narrow path. Liberationism and Liberation Theology purports to use a strong, central state to uplift man with the Tower of Babel – a splendid facade carried by a rotting core. This rot may come from bodies and graves – see those who died from the Holocaust or the Cambodian genocide, just to name a sliver of humanity's disastrous attempts at utopia. Indeed, while Plato meanders in his perfect vision of a *politeia* in the World of Forms, Aristotle knows that the practical best regime is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy.

Factionalism among interest groups will prevent any one from gaining too much power. The Catholic constitutions of Doolfuss and Salazar failed in one important aspect – the number of subsidiary regimes was fixed in a top-bottom manner, failing to assure voluntary association and creation. Hence Austria would forever have seven federal states, and Portugal would forever have delineated industrial groups—both systems fail-

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ing fast since the top-bottom bodily organization allowed their systems to be usurped and corrupted easily by the head. Gasser's solution to the Iron Law of Oligarchy calls for true subsidiarity and private law societies—self organization, light reliance on government and state, little bureaucracy, and community-focused taxation.

The Managerial Revolution in the Philippines

Modern liberalism, for most liberals is not a consciously understood set of rational beliefs, but a bundle of unexamined prejudices and conjoined sentiments. The basic ideas and beliefs seem more satisfactory when they are not made fully explicit, when they merely lurk rather obscurely in the background, coloring the rhetoric and adding a certain emotive glow.

James Burnham, *The Suicide of the West*

One key point in Marcos's Democratic Revolution from the Center was its nature as a liberal revolution from above – a top-down process similar to the French and English revolutions, Marcos claims. As such, technocratic and bureaucratic dominance made its headway in the Philippines. However, beyond the Fourth and Fifth Republic's institutions, we see this predominance creep in other sectors of society. The professional-managerial class can be seen as the premier caste in Philippine society, which everyone aspires to join, and which parents wish their children to partake in. This order, like many other aspects of Philippine society, finds its roots in the Revolution. However, this order forms only one manifestation of a global trend in process since the 19th century. We find James Burnham's thesis of the Managerial Revolution, with modifications, to properly explain Philippine society today.

Leviathan and its Enemies

Throughout the 19th century, traditional elites and institutions gradually faded as society became more massive in scale. Cottage industries, home

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workshops, and the like fell prey to clustered factories, sky high offices, and other monstrosities. This Revolution in Mass and Scale, as Samuel Francis puts it, made it more convenient to have a technocratic managerial population run society. The capitalist entrepreneurs fell to mass corporations dictated by shareholders, providing value to them instead of consumers. The paternalist governors, master tradesmen, and city councils fell to mass states and bureaucracies, hoping to put a show with people's taxes. Local news and word of mouth now rank second to reliable mass corporate news sources. Of course, these masses need management, and by the Iron Law of Oligarchy, these manager-professionals came out on top.

Like many elites, these manager-professionals obey the basic tenets of Elite Theory, explored further in another article. Peculiar to these managerials, as we shall call them, is their adopted ideology. We quote Samuel Francis,

Liberalism has reinforced the managerial regime in the United States in two general ways. First, the formal content of liberal ideas since the early 20th century has provided a coherent rationalization of the ideological formulas of meliorism and utopianism, scientism, hedonism, and cosmopolitanism that reflect the functional imperatives of mass organizations. Secondly, liberalism as a practical political and social movement has justified the structural elaboration and integration of the managerial regime in all respects. Legislation and policies associated with and implemented by liberal forces have promoted the fusion of state and economy, the growth of managerial bureaucracy in state and corporation, the rise of managerial Caesarism in the form of an "imperial Presidency," the centralization of government and the diminution of state and local authority, the homogenization of society, the diffusion of mass education, the secularization of religion, and other as-

pects of the managerial regime

Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*, Chapter 3

Modern Liberalism's proper origins lay in a reaction against the excesses of the French Revolution – a guided progress instead of shock therapy. We thus see an optimistic vision for man, belief in his inherent goodness, and a desire for an overclass to guide humanity. Particular social, biological, regional, and national identities were now anathema, and universal brotherhood was now a goal. Hence mass society began with nationalism and the nation state, where family and community fell to the wayside and allegiance to the state and to the nation were the most important civic virtues. Of course, nationalism would also fall to the wayside, as all stepping stones do. Everyone was special now, in their own individual ways. Economic Liberalism – a heresy with a specific definition only tangibly related to Economics – found that every man could be himself and move forward in his own special way without attachments, voluntary or not, to his peers or his community. And when everyone is special, no one is.

This managerial elite displaced traditional ones, as mentioned above. Mass, centralized control displaced local, community-driven power. Small business and local government exist only when big business and national government allow them. The Revolution of Mass and Scale outpaced and displaced traditional power structures, and the managerials swooped in to take the prize. The old order was localist, and focused only on their respective jurisdictions. Now, mass society of atomized individuals paradoxically leads to collectivist undertones and influences—nothing extrinsic makes anyone special, hence everyone intrinsically must dictate each other to be special.

These old elites never understood the specifics of what they owned or ruled – no skin in the game, as Nassim Taleb puts it. The managerials put on fake skin and made everyone focus on their facades. Indicators and metrics – GDP, corporate turnover, military metrics – these would take the place of bread and circuses in the new order. The masquerade demands

that these numbers go up yearly, despite their respective theories being value-free. Truly, while technical expertise defines the managerialials, they have but blinded grasps on theory, empirics, and methodology. One may indeed call the managerialials as ‘midwits’ – they have smidgens of academic concepts, and use their granular knowledge to justify their ascendancy over the unwitting working class. Real academics would know the truth behind their assertions, yet are neither flashy nor confident enough to be noticed.

The Managerial Revolution from Bonifacio to Marcos

What emerged was a mixture of free enterprise and governmental regulation. In theory, however, all property was potentially liable to the control of the state. If certain economic transactions were left uncontrolled, it was not because of intrinsic right. Rather, the social interest presumably was being served in the absence of regulation. Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*, Chapter 3

As real history tells us, Andres Bonifacio was a manager in a multinational British corporation, who also had a lucrative side-gig of selling canes, fans, and other luxury items. As a typical Millennial today would, he spent his free time reading vapid philosophical works – Voltaire, Victor Hugo, Eugène Sue, among others. Indeed, the Katipunan’s core membership came from similar backgrounds:

Most commonly and typically, therefore, the Katipunan activists were clerks, employees, agents, tobacco workers, printers and service personnel. They were indubitably proletarians in the Marxist sense, because they did not own any means of production and had to sell their labor in order to earn a living. Nevertheless, it is clear that Isabelo de los Reyes, Teodoro Agoncillo and others were wrong to classify them as collectively belonging to “the lowest stratum of society.” Their wages or

4.2 *The Managerial Revolution from Bonifacio to Marcos*

salaries were either around or above the median for the city in the mid-1890s.

Jim Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*

The provincial Tagalog (and some Kapampangan) nobility would also join, as would scores of defectors from the Spanish Army, Volunteers, and Civil Guard after Rizal's execution. Daniel Tirona and Edilberto Evangelista are two prime examples of the Katipunan's professional-managerial roots: one a lawyer, another a Belgian-educated civil engineer. As with the French Revolution, working class religiously-motivated counterrevolutions – compare the Kapampangans and Guardia de Honor with Brittany and the Vendee – erupted. Indeed, the native Ilocano priest turned Freemasonic Bishop Gregorio Aglipay was asked to suppress the latter as the Americans neared Tarlac, while the former fell into ruin and famine before the Americans even set foot from their ships.

Despite the Revolution's managerial roots, we see the exact opposite of what Burnham and Francis noticed. The traditional elite – nobility and retainers volunteering for duty under Spain – joined forces with the managerial core to form a hybrid elite in the Revolution's aftermath. While the working class languished and the Church fell into ruin, the new elite dominated the country and set to work accelerating mass society. Instead of local autonomy and elections, national sovereignty and leadership became the norm. The army, instead of a small national contingent with local volunteers and militias, became a national one, with people from far-away places expected to die and defend those who spoke different languages, had different worldviews, practiced different customs and culture. The Filipino's atomization from his community and family had now begun.

Democratic party influence spurred America's war with Spain over Cuba, and the Revolution convinced Spain to sell more, in the Treaty of Paris, than Luzon as was originally planned. The Americans had always been in conflict about what to do with the Philippines, with the isolationist Old Right demanding exit against war hawks and Democrats demanding

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to “civilize” the locals. Eventually, local government was allowed to prevent further American political turmoil. As with the Maura Law (1895), local elections would go on, but now with the new elite in place. We see that the traditional elites co-opted the managerial style, and joined forces with the Revolution’s instigators to rule the new nation-state. To illustrate, just look at current big-name politicians: Gloria Arroyo was a NEDA bureaucrat, Rodrigo Duterte is a lawyer, so are Leni Robredo and her late husband, Francisco Pangilinan has an MPA, Noynoy Aquino was a manager in Hacienda Luisita before entering Congress, and Sara Duterte went into Pediatrics before law. In Pampanga’s case, Mayor Carmelo Lazatin of Angeles has an MBA, Governor Dennis Pineda came from Business Management, former Mayor Edgardo Pamintuan of Angeles is a lawyer, and Mayor Emmanuel Alejandrino of Arayat has a Bachelor’s degree – these last two are descendants of noble families that betrayed the Kapampangans and sided with the First Republic. All except Arroyo have neither academic nor working class backgrounds, while Arroyo herself remained in a bureaucratic capacity without branching into theory or empirics. Even Mayor Isko Moreno of Manila, despite coming from a working class background, joined the Managerial Establishment’s ranks with an MPA to prove it.

Going forward to Marcos’s regime, we see him ordering the Professional Regulation Commission’s establishment in 1973 – one of his many steps towards formalizing the Managerial Establishment’s ascendancy. Marcos himself was a successful lawyer, with the added benefit of family ties – his grandfather was an Ilocano nobleman during Spanish rule, and his father was a congressman in the American period. The PRC, however, further cemented barriers to entry for the Managerial Elite and serves as a gatekeep – elite overproduction carries on regardless, with the PRC’s judges resting on graduate professional credentials and arbitrary exam judgements beyond machine checking. Marcos also carried out textbook Liberal changes—we discussed previously how Marcos did the very thing that Samuel Francis above explains. Indeed, Marcos explicitly lays out an

endgame of centralized Liberal managerialism:

There is another type of revolution, one which is carried out by the assimilation of the revolutionary classes into the existing order, resulting as in the case of the other type, in a different social order. This is the liberal type of revolution.

The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 57.

The Managerial establishment manifested in social welfare programs, the technocracy, Five-Year plans in Soviet vein, and much more. Joseph Scalice notes how the 1939 Communist party (PKP-39) adopted a Stalinist bent in support of Marcos, and the succeeding CPP's schism:

Stalinism was the programmatic expression of the political interests of privileged layers of the ruling party bureaucracies in Moscow and Beijing. Seeking to defend and expand the social basis of their positions, the bureaucrats put forward the nationalist perspective of building socialism in one country as the paramount political task. World socialist revolution was subordinate to this end. . .

Many of the leading political operatives at the helm of Communist parties were drawn to the program of Stalinism because it was seen as a means of implementing nationalist reforms. Sison and Lava shared this enthusiasm. It allowed them to deploy the banner of Marxism and use it to win mass support for the industrialization of the economy under native capitalist ownership, in opposition to the control of major foreign corporations. Loans from and trade with the Soviet bloc were seen as an additional measure in furtherance of this end. When he was still a leading member of the PKP, Sison had organized mass support for Ferdinand Marcos on this basis and endorsed his election in 1965.

Joseph Scalice, *Fifty years since the publication of Philippine Society and Revolution*

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Indeed, Burnham contests that the Soviet Union realized that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat could not bring about real Communism, and shifted to a managerial bent late in Lenin's time. Stalin would accelerate this push, at the same time Nazi Germany and the United States began adopting Managerial policies:

They can say that it was all because Stalin got into power instead of Trotsky or because of the failure of other nations to revolt or because of Russia's backwardness. Next time. . . things will be different. But the fact remains that Stalin did get into power, that the other nations did not successfully revolt, and that the revolution did take place in a backward country ; and that the Russian revolution led not toward socialism but toward something most unlike socialism.

James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, Chapter 4: Proletarian Revolution

Nevertheless, it may still turn out that the new form of economy will be called "socialist." In those nations—Russia and Germany—which have advanced fluthest toward the new economy, "socialism" or "national socialism" is the term ordinarily used. The motivation for this terminology is not, naturally, the wish for scientific clarity but just the opposite. The word "socialism" is used for ideological purposes in order to manipulate the favourable mass emotions attached to the historic socialist ideal of a free, classless, and international society and to hide the fact that the managerial economy is in actuality the basis for a new kind of exploiting, class society. If the new rulers continue their present verbal usage, a book like this one is not going to change the linguistic outcome. For scientific purposes, however, the necessity remains to distinguish clearly the new economy (whatever it may be called) from the projected economy which was part of the traditional socialist

ideal.

James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, Chapter 9: The Economy of Managerial Society

Of course, Managerialism could have only taken off after the Revolution of Mass and Scale. Mass society in the Philippines has certainly gone beyond cementing into curing. Nationalism now is the most important civic virtue, the nation more important than the family, or the community, or the region. National myths, like those of Rizal or Bonifacio or the Commonwealth, pervade more than local histories. Indeed, Burnham noticed this tendency in Russia:

But the death of all the early leaders was an important ritual act in establishing the mass attitudes of managerial society and in strengthening the foundations of the managerial institutions.

James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, Chapter 14: The Russian Way

Hence local histories of Spanish times present Marxian analogies and concepts, while foreign historians trained in the *Annales* School remain the gold standard for Philippine History. Mass society also manifests in the president being for all “Filipinos”, speaking Tagalog to everyone except his native people, the mass national media dominating ratings and sales, among so many other manifestations. The Filipino has been atomized into only being a Filipino, with obligations only to the Philippine State—see how popular it is to denigrate provincials for prioritizing their families, or being “regionalist”. As a last note, this order also finds antecedents in Tagalog culture and institutions as discussed before – the Establishment simply co-opted these to accelerate the atomization and further collectivization of Philippine society. The ennui and decay in Pampanga from Managerialism is a symptom of the Tagalog cancer spreading. Changes in Tagalog culture and institutions need to happen to prevent this from happening again.

On a sidenote, the best historians' works—John Larkin, Joseph Scalice, Jim Richardson, Damon Woods, Father John Schumacher SJ, among others—are available online for free, while the likes of Agoncilio and Constantino remain barred behind bookshops and paywalls. The only local historian of Annales caliber, Luciano Santiago, suffers from his works being obscure and hard to find.

Epilogue: Kapampangan Alliance of High and Low Against the Middle

There are no exceptions. No theory, no promises, no morality, no amount of goodwill, no religion will restrain power. Neither priests nor soldiers, neither labor leaders or businessman, neither bureaucrats nor feudal lords will differ from each other in the basic use which they will seek to make of power. Only power restrains power. That restraining power is expressed in the existence and activity of oppositions. When all opposition is destroyed, there is no longer any limit to what power may do.

James Burnham, *The Machiavellians—Part 7: Politics and Truth*, Chapter 2: *The Meaning of Democracy*

Pampanga today sees centrism dominating. Indeed, the professional-managerial class is the fastest growing one here—with all associated baggage. Most Kapampangan academics fall in step with the Establishment—socially, economically, politically. The Kapampangan working class, however, represents a silent majority. To illustrate, early in the Wuhan Pandemic, the working class stood the strongest against mandatory vaccination and lockdowns. Pampanga remained at a 10% vaccination rate till November 2021, when the government enforced stringent rules in the province to force vaccinations. The vaccination rate rose to 65% in a month out of coercion—provincial officials went house-to-house and saw

4.3 Epilogue: *Kapampangan Alliance of High and Low Against the Middle*

that residents take the vaccine. The new Omicron variant, however, will surely see earlier fears vindicated.

The time thus is ripe for a Vanguard of Kapampangan 10s—those with enough knowledge and expertise to influence and build institutions in advance. Provided that these institutions succeed, the Kapampangan working class will follow after them. This Vanguard need not be made of formal academics—anyone with the will and time to study and practice may and should serve in it. Only power restrains power, thus the need to build new licensures, new schools, new institutes, all in the vein and mold of proper doxis and praxis. The next decade will see a breaking point in Kapampangan society—Generation X will begin retiring, the Millennials will grow fat and lazy, and Generation Z will polarize further into extremes. We thus need to spread right-wing thought and theory—by studying, practicing, earning, working, and most importantly, praying.

5

The Three Occupational Classes

In previous articles, we alluded to a typology of what we call the Occupational Classes based on how much theoretical knowledge each class needs.

We expound on this concept here:

- Working class: work jobs that require low theoretical knowledge. Not necessarily just peasants or proletariat in the Marxian sense; our typology includes the petty bourgeoisie, kulaks, and other small-scale traditional factor owners. The main draw between the working classes is their little need for theoretical knowledge, supplanted by experience in the field, boots on the ground decision making, craft dedication, and character shaped by their work.
- Academic class: work jobs that require high theoretical knowledge, whether researchers, academics, or scientific consultants. Once again, ownership of traditional factors of production is not a requirement. This class works in theoretical fields, using their expertise on bigger picture matters. May be deficient in ground level matters, but knowing these lets them direct all strands to a whole tapestry.
- Professional-managerial class: work jobs that require middle of the road theoretical knowledge, with what little existing justifying standards, ethics, codes of conduct, and other regulated rules. Neither proficient in the bigger picture nor the ground level, instead very self-centered and competitive.

Unlike traditional castes and class, this typology relies on a nonstandard factor of production—human capital. Formal and legal credentials matter not—Clark Maxwell had no formal education, yet can definitely be counted as part of the academic class for founding Electromagnetism. Similarly, doctors and lawyers who engage with biochemical and political theory can also be counted as part of the academic class—this was the or-

der in pre-industrial times, where academics also performed white-collar services as consultants. Lastly, engineers and architects used to rely on quick calculations and rules of thumb before advances in Physics and Mechanics made engineering a more exact craft—a working class occupation transformed into a professional-managerial one. An engineer who works in theoretical mechanics would immediately ascend to the academic class. As Aristotle would think, it is what the worker does that matter, not what he is called.

The professional-managerial class evolved from centralizing power and authority, with absolute monarchs and corporate boards needing obedient, subservient workers to manage what they own. Like the *mamelukes*, however, this class subsumed the centralized monarchies and turned them into oligarchies, as the Iron Law predicts. Now, the professional-managerial elite display their midwifery anywhere they go, to anyone they meet. Vapid platitudes matter more than passed-down knowledge or theoretical frameworks. Out-of-context quotes and aphorisms now count as philosophy—see Nietzsche’s and Sartre’s, Einstein’s and Carl Sagan’s popularity over political theorists, economists, mathematicians, and scientists. No professional-managerial would know who Menger or Mandelbrot were, or know the difference between a homeomorphism or a hylemorphism. They wouldn’t know to measure twice and cut once, what side of a tool to use. Instead, they have arrogant knowledge of codes and standards, which require no thinking and all application, a prime practice to purge prudence from their ranks.

Hence Machiavelli defines three types of intelligence:

- One who makes new knowledge.
- One who appreciates others’ made knowledge.
- One who neither makes nor appreciates’ others’ new knowledge.

Of course, all three types exist in all classes. However, the Managerial Elite’s nature—what they do, how they do, and for what purposes – makes the third type concentrate in their ranks. Type 1 and 2 intelligences in the

5 *The Three Occupational Classes*

Managerial Elite will be more drawn to the academe, or the very least escape their midwifery. The working class produces new knowledge on the ground, the academic class produces new knowledge in the world of forms. Both appreciate what their colleagues do, and can definitely appreciate what the other class does for society. The professional-managerial class envies not just other classes, but each other within their ranks—the rat race to the top is prime breeding ground for this kind of behavior.

Now we can cast Curtis Yarvin's BDH-OV conflict as a divide between Leftists from all occupational classes, and an alliance of high (academic) and low (working) on the Right. Right-wing professional-managers do not have the capability to fight—instead, an Aristocrat-Pleb alliance is the only viable tactic in advancing a new Paleo alliance.

We end this piece by envisioning the new Paleo alliance—paleoconservatives, paleolibertarians, and neoreaction. These three groups share more than what they differ in, and most differences are a question of semantics, empirical knowledge, historical knowledge, some theory, and other accidental matters. These can be easily mended by calm discussion, and a strong desire not to argue past the other. Words like state become an issue because one camp uses the Declarative definition (people, land, ruler, sovereignty) while another uses the Weberian definition (coercive entity with a monopoly of violence) while yet others would use the Recognition definition (a state becomes one upon recognition by other states). Anarchy is also a contentious word, with some declaring it the nonexistence of hierarchy, while others the lack of coercive governments, and still others with chaos and disorder. This new Paleo alliance draws back to similar ideas from the Old Right, from Scholastic and Aristotelian thought, from Right-wing political theory, and so on. Its existence is definitely possible if interested parties actually discuss their views.

Oversocialization and Two Minutes’ Hate: Institutionalized Leftist Dominance in Manila’s Establishment

The Managerial Establishment through Blurred Lenses

Theodore Kaczynski’s manifesto *Industrial Society and its Future* posits that the Industrial Revolution ruined the telos of man with regards to survival, and forced him to adopt surrogate teloi to pass the time. As points regarding his claims, Kaczynski brings up the logical extreme of what he calls *Industrial Society*.

Leftism, he notes, comes from a specific psychology. The first tendency he calls “feelings of inferiority”, which we can summarize as envy. Self-hatred from having less drives leftists into masochistic tendencies, whether getting run over by a carriage to promote women’s suffrage or obeying society’s strict rules and regulations no matter how overbearing just to present oneself as politically correct.

The second tendency is much more relevant to our discussion. Oversocialization both comes from and leads to the first tendency. Kaczynski himself explains it best:

Psychologists use the term “socialization” to designate the process by which children are trained to think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if he believes in and obeys the moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that society. It may seem senseless to say that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a rebel. Nevertheless, the position can be defended.

Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 24

It is cliché to say that democracy is fake and is bread and circuses for the masses. Of course, one easily also sees that Leftism, despite being rebellious, is a dominant force in society today.

The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off his psychological leash and assert his autonomy by rebelling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most basic values of society. Generally speaking, the goals of today's leftists are NOT in conflict with the accepted morality. On the contrary, the left takes an accepted moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then accuses mainstream society of violating that principle. Examples: racial equality, equality of the sexes, helping poor people, peace as opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom of expression, kindness to animals. More fundamentally, the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. All these have been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its middle and upper classes for a long time. These values are explicitly or implicitly expressed or presupposed in most of the material presented to us by the mainstream communications media and the educational system. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel against these principles but justify their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth) that society is not living up to these principles.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 28

Hence those who lead society today were rebelling against it decades ago, while those rebelling against society today will lead it in a few more. Cancel culture is but a temporary yet telling acceleration of this tendency – creative destruction halts more and more, and entropy now starts setting in as differences and all cause for envy dissipate.

Kaczynski now paints Leftism as but a symptom of a larger disease. He claims that Industrial Society, as he calls the post-Industrial Revolution world, was able to make attaining basic needs much easier, and hence man started looking for surrogate activities to cope with this loss of purpose. With Existentialism, man now needed to look for his own, to go above good and evil and make his own path lest he fall to his despair and become the hedonistic last man. This self-serving hunt for purpose, however, failed for higher ideals mixed with passion led to failed utopias and even greater conflict. Kaczynski claims that modern technology needs to go away not in a political, but an anti-technological and social one to ensure man returns to good processing and living.

Missing the Trees for the Forest

Unfortunately, Kaczynski diagnosed the illness to cause the pathogen. His painting of Industrial Society is simply one sketch of Centralization and Managerialism. As Neo-reactionaries know, culture is downstream from politics, not the other way around. The conditions which Kaczynski points to are a consequence of the Revolution of Mass and Scale and eventual atomization, spurred on by a top-bottom process.

To illustrate, we use one of what Kaczynski calls surrogate activities. Science and academia in general has existed for much longer than Industrial Society. Hence the Scholastics discovered precursors to modern calculus, political theory, and physics, among others. Imperial Chinese bureaucracy favored those proficient in Confucian classics. The Roman Stoics, Plotinus and his students, Socrates and his lineages, all these engaged in so-called surrogate activities without an inkling of Industrial Society. Neither were they always free of worry from food or other basic needs. In the most extreme case, the Great Famine and the Black Death hit Europe in the 14th Century, when the Scholastics continued their thought and growth. The Renaissance saw the death rate skyrocket, while painters and musicians idled away performing their surrogate activities. Song Dy-

nasty China faced multiple threats from the North, eventually falling to Mongol invaders. Indeed, Kaczynski overestimates how much effort biological basics need, for man has always found other ways to pass the time besides survival.

Indeed, Kaczynski repeatedly blames on technology its users' actions. An overbearing government needs no industrial technology, only that people are subservient and unintelligent enough to not see cracks in the facade. The more powerful in a land dispute will inevitably bully the other one, whether it is with a stone, a sword, an AK-47, or a nuclear missile. Great irony pervades his manifesto, for he talks repeatedly about government interference yet never stops to think that top-bottom processes have been spiraling modernity ever downwards. So while Kaczynski's *The System's Neatest Trick* describes the Establishment's actions and needs well, it never accurately describes the Establishment itself. *Elite Theory* and the *Iron Law of Oligarchy* see Industrial Society as yet another manifestation of how power affects human action. It thus quite unfortunate that Kaczynski has fallen into the midwit trap of missing the trees for the forest.

Technology can be Used against its Master

Kaczynski claims that modern technology is too important for modern society to embrace only the good parts instead of the bad. For one example,

Conservatives and some others advocate more "local autonomy." Local communities once did have autonomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local communities become more enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities, computer networks, highway systems, the mass communications media, the modern health care system. Also operating against autonomy is the fact that technology applied in one location often affects people at other locations far way. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contaminate the water supply hundreds of miles down-

stream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 118

Unfortunately, Kaczynski has blamed the consequences of the Revolution of Mass and Scale once again on technology. Sure, one can blame the Revolution on technology, but one needs that link in-between lest the whole chain fall apart. A factory affecting a downstream community is no more or less different than those washing their clothes or dumping manure upstream. The difference is that the latter knew not to do that there, or at the very least suffered the consequences from the village. That factories

Managerialism simply used technology the same way the Manila Establishment used Tagalog culture. However, one can be used against its master while the other cannot. Tagalog culture lies in the World of Forms – an abstraction from common institutions and practices that the Tagalog people cherish. Using it will gain the same results as “liberals are the real racists”-type argumentation, for its telos lies elsewhere. Similarly, voting and elections will not work, for the Establishment was built to support its makers only.

Technology, however, used to be a bottom-top process, a consequence of ingenious men and their patrons. Today that patron is the government, who funds all basic research without regard to risk or reward, only how premise interests the judge. Private patrons, however, are more selective, more choosy. They knew what basic research or invention to fund for they had purpose. Even the purest of Mathematics can be pursued for its own sake, or even for baser reasons, for Mathematics’ deductive nature ensures that further works needs to be done whatever the application. Indeed, technology is completely accidental to a society, or to time period, or to a family – it is how they use it, for what purpose, and for how long that sets it into form.

The Managerial Establishment as the Real Culprit

Aristotle knew that true human flourishing entailed the right ingredients going for the right purpose. A man had his body and biology going not just for external procreation, but for leadership, strength, camaraderie. A woman had hers not just for internal procreation, but for harmony, warmth, support. True human flourishing thus needs the right mix as Aristotle explains:

And the same thing appears to follow from its self-sufficiency, for the complete good seems to be self-sufficient. And by the self-sufficient we mean not what suffices for oneself alone, living one's life as a hermit, but also with parents and children and a wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, since a human being is by nature meant for a city. But one must take some limit for these connections, since by stretching out to ancestors and descendants and friends of one's friends they go beyond all bounds; but this must be examined later.

Ethics, Book 1 Chapter 7

Kaczynski's idea of self-sufficiency now falls apart, for man needs these goods, and technology serves one way to obtain them. One needs no internet to meet friends, but a conversation by the local bus stop or train station may suffice. Technology's being has no telos built into it beyond what it was built for – it is value-free, and only the purpose of its use itself needs to be scrutinized. Hence why Tagalog culture cannot be salvaged – it was built from the start to benefit women and their managerial husbands. Same with the Managerial Establishment, or Communism, or anything else similar.

Kaczynski thus fails to see how atomization came about from the Revolution of Mass and Scale, and itself lead to crowding and mass society. Top-bottom procedures with their rules and regulations were needed not to preserve technologically-built societies, but to serve the Manage-

6.4 *The Managerial Establishment as the Real Culprit*

rial Establishment and the professional-managerial class. Envy and oversocialization are necessary for the professional-managerial class to proceed. Hence why being “professional” is suddenly a civic virtue – the professional-managerial class made it so. Straightforwardness, curtness, and directness – typically masculine traits – fell prey to the woman-propped Establishment which made subtlety, meandering, and doubletalk important. Indeed, Kaczynski fails to see that Big Government and Big Business go hand-in-hand:

Conservatives’ efforts to decrease the amount of government regulation are of little benefit to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the regulations can be eliminated because most regulations are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation affects business rather than the average individual, so that its main effect is to take power from the government and give it to private corporations. What this means for the average man is that government interference in his life is replaced by interference from big corporations, which may be permitted, for example, to dump more chemicals that get into his water supply and give him cancer. The conservatives are just taking the average man for a sucker, exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote the power of Big Business.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 65

In fact, most regulations are only necessary because the government allows joint-stock limited liability corporations in the first place. These regulations themselves now need more regulations, because the government believes that only it can solve what itself caused. The only reason the government lets these entities even exist is because letting someone else manage one’s wealth is so much easier – bureaucracies popped up in Early Modern centralized absolute monarchies for this exact reason. Again, like Mamelukes, this class usurped traditional society and made themselves

rulers. Modernity is ultimately the age of bureaucracy, of professionals, of managers, of rules and regulations – technology is only accidental to it, and could help either that or traditional society. In fact Kaczynski himself shows that he gets this to some degree:

Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules and not only by the government. Control is often exercised through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or manipulation, and by organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole. Most large organizations use some form of propaganda to manipulate public attitudes or behavior. Propaganda is not limited to “commercials” and advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously intended as propaganda by the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment programming is a powerful form of propaganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law that says we have to go to work every day and follow our employer’s orders. Legally there is nothing to prevent us from going to live in the wild like primitive people or from going into business for ourselves. But in practice there is very little wild country left, and there is room in the economy for only a limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us can survive only as someone else’s employee.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 73

However, Kaczynski instead blames technology instead of its users, which makes sense considering his rather deterministic and even materialistic view of how institutions and history work. Indeed, Kaczynski contradicts himself in two points:

Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive. In matters that are irrelevant to the functioning of the system we can generally do what we please. We can believe in any religion (as long as it does not encourage behavior that is dan-

6.4 *The Managerial Establishment as the Real Culprit*

gerous to the system). We can go to bed with anyone we like (as long as we practice “safe sex”). We can do anything we like as long as it is UNIMPORTANT. But in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our behavior.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 72

Here Kaczynski shows how he knows that culture is downstream of politics. Despite saying this, Kaczynski goes on to claim that this kind of action is impossible and falls to despair:

A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to function as it was designed to do.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 105

Economically speaking, this is true. Culturally speaking, however, top-bottom changes happen regularly – the Managerial Establishment and its dominance is but one proof of this. Only power restrains power, but the lack of other powers through the monopoly of violence allowed this system to succeed. Priests of power who treat it as God will do their best to keep it, hence why the Party members were the most monitored, most pressured in 1984.

Kaczynski goes on to set forth a plan to overthrow Industrial Society. In simplest terms, he advocates acceleration by letting a One World Economy form and installing dictators in industrially advanced states to let the inevitable inefficiency break everything down. He sees history as a straight line of instead of cyclical, and similar to Marx, envisions only one dialectical outcome through simultaneous revolution. As O’Brien would put it, the manifesto is true “as description, yes. The program it sets forth is nonsense.” We cannot pin all blame to him, however, since he had no access to the Scholastics, and Joe Sachs had not yet published his translations. Hence, we find great value in his analysis of Leftist psychology.

Manila's Establishment and Two Minutes Hate

As we have discussed before, Manila follows global trends in Managerialism rather well. Oversocialization, in fact, took root here much faster after Tagalog culture accelerated in spread and growth. The impulse to rebel, of course, grew ever larger, allowing the Establishment's neatest trick to play out:

All of us in modern society are hemmed in by a dense network of rules and regulations. We are at the mercy of large organizations such as corporations, governments, labor unions, universities, churches, and political parties, and consequently we are powerless. As a result of the servitude, the powerlessness, and the other indignities that the System inflicts on us, there is widespread frustration, which leads to an impulse to rebel. And this is where the System plays its neatest trick: Through a brilliant sleight of hand, it turns rebellion to its own advantage.

The System's Neatest Trick, Part 2 Paragraph 1

Atomization causes an imbalance in social capital, where attaining such incentivizes professional-managerial behavior. Of course, doing so puts load on them, and an impulse to rebel causes herdlike behavior among the lucky few. To live in a society today thus means to follow the crowd's impulses and be lucky to have social capital.

Many advantages do exist to social capital today, much more than human capital. Universities and colleges favor those with friends among faculty and seniors, not just here and abroad. Meritocracy in fact is no longer as highly favored – being a “people person” and “team player” is more important than skills or experience. Indeed, Kaczynski notes that the professional-managerial class prioritizes applications and standards more than thinking and prudence:

It is enough to go through a training program to acquire some

6.5 *Manila's Establishment and Two Minutes Hate*

petty technical skill, then come to work on time and exert the very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements are a moderate amount of intelligence and, most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society takes care of one from cradle to grave.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 40

Instead of technology, however, we point out that what kept ennui from dawning on the academic class in preindustrial times was that the managerials and bureaucracy never existed, the service sector was divided between the academe and the working class, and known men better served public administration and judgement. The mid-tier technical knowledge never came to be for either theory, experience, or both suffice.

Hence the professional-managerial class today seeks an outlet through Leftism. No better rebellion exists than fighting a government which supports one's ideals, for it is a rebellion against reason (logos) itself. No better example exists than Manila's underbelly.

Manila is a fine example of a hive of scum and villainy, where the working class and the academe have followed the professional-managerial class's behavior and now seek to cut the tall poppies, hammer down the proud nails. Tagalog culture as espoused by the Managerial Regime distills itself to its rawest, not caring about ancestry or work or sex or age, but envy and oversocialization transcending these all. A true collectivist society where no one goes against the grain while aestheticizing it, no one thinks out of the box while encouraging it, no one rebels against the government while shouting and screaming for it. Manila is where entropic Tagalog Managerialism found its final form, and is steadily approaching it. Creative destruction falls prey to envy, the big corporations are both targets and brothers in arms.

Now news coverage sensationalizes those worthy of sensationalizing, politely mentions big news, and covers up important items. Anger and hatred flow out as the tragedy unfolds on-air, ending up as post-play cathar-

sis as the hero falls to hubris, and the tragedist media collect tips from watchers. Senator so-and-so never should have stolen the money, President this-and-that never should have made that comment. All this while big business and big government swallow up what remaining pie there is.

As managerials would have it, they would rather follow the rules and regulations of what to do when tragedy strikes rather than study why it happens and how to avoid it. Give thoughts and prayers, criticize those who air their thoughts and prayers as platitudes. The working man would get into action and fix the problem through persistence and trial and error. The academic would know how to fix the problem and fix it when conditions are right (even through trial and error ie with Math). The professional-managerial, however, idles by and has a higher up fix it.

Ego-boosting and posturing definitely pervade managerials, and two-minutes hate form only one ritual in this grander telos. These would never study history, or political theory, or even the most basic logical reasoning, yet would clamor for a great leader only to eat him (or her) up after a year. The cycle continues, yet never ends for they would never take the courage to leave their comfort zone and learn proper political theory – they would rather post “leave your comfort zone” on social media and try (then fail) to do something of note. Excellence requires persistence, to remain active, not to decline into entropy. As Aristotle puts it,

But it is necessary to say not only this, that it is an active condition, but also what sort of active condition it is. And something one ought to state is that every virtue, as well as bringing that of which it is the virtue to completion in a good condition, also makes it yield work of a good kind, as the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work first-rate, since by means of the excellence of the eye we see well. Similarly, the excellence of a horse both makes it a first-rate horse, and makes it good at running, at carrying its rider, and at holding still in the face of enemies. So if this is the way things are in all cases, then

also the virtue of a human being would be the active condition from which one becomes a good human being and from which one will yield up one's own work well.

Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6

A Case Study

We turn now to local Traditional Catholics as a case study regarding Manila. Here we see many professional-managerial tendencies— aestheticism, oversocialization, entropy – all converge. Many of these types come from the *Societas Ecclesia Dei Sancti Iosephi*, but what we write is relevant to all reading, too.

Aestheticism manifests in their need for a sense of the sacred. True, the liturgy's aesthetics serve to let all mortal flesh keep silent for the intellect to witness Calvary's immortality. However, the sense of the sacred as end in itself is not the telos of the liturgy. Hence why many traditionalists declare that *lex orandi lex credendi* – they think that having good aesthetics suddenly clears their mind, that liturgy is a testing ground for the Faith's doctrine, and that doctrine's merit comes from having produced piety and sanctity through the liturgy. We let Pius XII explain better:

We refer to the error and fallacious reasoning of those who have claimed that the sacred liturgy is a kind of proving ground for the truths to be held of faith, meaning by this that the Church is obliged to declare such a doctrine sound when it is found to have produced fruits of piety and sanctity through the sacred rites of the liturgy, and to reject it otherwise. Hence the epigram, "*Lex orandi, lex credendi*" – the law for prayer is the law for faith. But this is not what the Church teaches and enjoins.

Pius XII, *Mediator Dei* Paragraph 46

Indeed, to favor the Traditional Latin Mass for its aesthetics, and to claim

that the sense of the sacred produces good doctrine, is no better than Pentecostals or Charismatics blurting gibberish for the emotional high – that is the sense of the sacred for them, and claiming *lex orandi lex credendi* means that the Pentecostals had it right.

Instead, Pius XII notes that *lex credendi legem statuat supplicandi* – doctrine informs prayer. To work with the sense of the sacred first is inductive, to work with doctrine first is deductive – a complete difference. Indeed, the Traditional Mass is replete with Scriptural symbolism in its actions and gestures – doctrine informing prayer. Twentieth century innovations like dialogue Masses, singing congregations, and more only serve the illusion that the Mass is a social meal, whose social aspect is important.

This aestheticism, however, is typical of professional-managerial oversocialization looking for an outlet. The world is ugly and dirty, so traditional aestheticism serves as yet another example of the impulse to rebel. This serves at once as belonging to an identity following atomization, and keeping a safe facade to hide behind.

Next, one can find oversocialization in action when seeing how their views favor the Managerial Establishment. Strong government, collectivist tendencies, dichotomous support for/against the military/government/institutions, a lack of Aristotelian prudence to follow the crowd. Hence Leni Robredo is so popular among them – we need to show mercy and compassion to sodomites, we need to enact social justice for the (non-Aristotelian/Thomistic) common good, we need to favor a lack of corruption over Church teaching or political pragmatism or realism. And of course, these tendencies are extremely rebellious, and everyone who believes in them is favored by everyone else who believes in them. Provincials who just want to be left alone will now be forced to wear pink alongside rainbow colors, and get atomized more than Manila has already. Of course, if the great strongwoman says that vaccines aren't mandatory, then forget if I hardheartedly supported them for the past year—let Leni

lead!

If not Leni Robredo, then the gay marriage supporting military-favoring mandate imposing Marcos will serve as the perfect strongman to bring discipline and cohesion to an already oversocialized populace. Never mind that provincials don't care who's in charge as long as they aren't bothered with, Bongbong Marcos will further atomize them more than Manila has already. Hatred of regionalism or favoring families will only intensify since everyone needs to chip in for the so-called "Filipino" people. Unfortunately, his foreign policy receives little credit despite being the most pragmatic and realistic of all candidates – his degeneracy and managerialism, however, gets the lion's share.

Unfortunately, the two only cherry-pick accidental Managerial properties while retaining its final telos – mass society serving the state. The "country", the "people", any other abstract ideal are all myths that hide the pursuit for power. This Managerial Oligarchy has nothing else in mind but self-preservation and tax collection. Unfortunately, these midwits who prefer the sense of the sacred cannot see past accidentals into universals, and stick to a Nominalism-lite with their motte-and-bailey tactics and utter disregard for theory.

Finally, these tendencies ultimately stabilize in entropy. They wish not to go past their comfort zones and stick only to an aesthetic traditionalism, hence their hatred for reactionary tendencies. They wish not to study further theory, and only to stay in their professional-managerial rules and regulations. It doesn't matter if you provided nothing to society by studying films and movies on taxpayer money for 13 years, at least you followed your passion and sought to preserve the Establishment. Getting hurt is a cardinal sin, even in pursuit of growth. Pursuing growth is a necessity even if it leads to hurt. Don't waste your energy on useless things. Do useless things even if they waste your energy. Contradictory feel-good statements typical of millennials (properly defined to be born 1980-1995, not Gen Z), whose conciliation comes only with Prudential thinking: whether

doing something is worth it or not.

Entropy, of course, pervades their thinking, leading them to support the Establishment, to pursue Managerialism, to have a higher-up decide for them, to not bear the consequences of their action. Manila has converged to this for a century, and the coming decade will see its end results.

True Human Flourishing

Since we see that every city is some kind of association, and every association is organized for the sake of some good (since everything everyone does is for the sake of something seeming to be good), it is clear that all associations aim at something good, and that the one that is most sovereign and encompasses all the others aims at the most sovereign of all goods. And this is the one called the city, the political association.

Politics, Book 1, Chapter 1

The Managerial Establishment is doomed to fall, for its focus on abstract metrics and indicators can hide the rot underneath for so long. China is not a threat to anyone since its own Managerial Establishment is too busy holding together the falling enterprise. War-mongers need only wait if their real goal is to defeat the CCP, for the CCP is doing a much better job with much better results than they ever could. Making pacts with China ought not to stir trouble, since it is best to benefit from them before they fall. The same goes with the Establishment here – it is doomed to crack this decade, and collapse in the following. Its telos serves it and only it, and no leader can salvage it. To think that elections can manage the Establishment well are futile – a chair is not meant to travel the air, a boy is not meant to fight in war, a despotic Establishment is not meant to serve or lead the people.

Hence the problems of Industrial Society need not be stamped out, for doing so only prolongs the process. One need not accelerate it either, for

the shock will come too strongly for people to cope. The GOP Mises Caucus favors Archotropism: building new institutions and incentivizing local populaces to switch to them. Violent insurrections might be necessary, but building new institutions will make them much easier to carry out.

Kaczynski fell into despair and enacted an ultimately fruitless campaign of terrorism. Those who wish to see the Establishment's fall must instead work, study, exercise, and pray – the restored order will have much use of these kinds of people who value themselves, their families, and their local communities.

The Unabomber Manifesto: A Generation Hence

Editor's Note: This is a guest post by Nomadic Prolet, an up and coming Philippine Historian responding and commenting on the previous Critique of Industrial Society and its Future.

It was the year 1995. Four years after the dissolution of the USSR, six years after the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc and scarcely sixteen years since the first Great Reset of the contemporary era, known as the Volcker shock. Within this ephemeral timespan, observers and commentators heaved a sigh of relief. The time, they proclaim, for ideology is over, and the human species will no longer argue nor entertain other modes of organization, for liberalism has triumphed. Politics is devolved into either cultural identifications or in standard operating procedure; the (heavily-rigged) market is foisted as the tool for central planning and for a moment, the establishment assumed that whatever disagreements that one can have in this new millennium, it will be resolvable through means-testing and the bipartisan consensus. Only a few marginal individuals desisted for what they saw as a grand delusion. Ted Kaczynski is one of them.

It is important to have a sort of a background when discussing Industrial Society and its Future, much how every single monograph is a product of its era. They tend to embody a moment in the present, mostly absent of a concrete vision of what is to come, and Ted's opus is not exempt from it. While those who bought into the narrative of the end of history did trash the venture as screeds of a mentally ill man, they are only partially correct, and Ted himself admits this openly. He is after all, a participant in one of the most notorious experiments conducted by the Deep State in select

persons; MKULTRA as they referred it. As such, it is not that surprising to deduce that Ted's ramblings are a consequence of these processes that he himself had been subjected; for the government, he is nothing but a lab rat. As a materialist, my focus will be the unfolding of contradictions as they happen, and I do not claim that this assessment is all-encompassing; what it may give us is a sketch.

Another highlight of his essay is his virulent opposition to technology, that understandably fell on deaf ears. The postmodern West has accepted the same premise of its prior modernist mom or dad; that technology is a force of progress and goodness. Ted is not the only person to show that this is a load of bunk. The philosopher Martin Heidegger already fore-saw its implications as early as his *Being and Time*, where the view of technology by the West is always geared for utility; utility being as pure ends. In his *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger invoked that its instruments have been converted as a standing reserve; a standing reserve in pursuit of an optimistic end, if this optimism is positive to begin with. Despite not being openly acknowledged unlike Jacques Ellul, whose conclusions on technology have trekked the same path as Heidegger, Ted's genesis can be understood as an attempt to simplify the jargons of both; that technology, contrary to the expectation that it is value-free or a force for good that can be switched off and on, is a representation of a civilization's priorities; it therefore correct for him to point out that conservatives and progressives in this regard are both sides of the same coin, who share a common telos and whose assumptions are hinging to the journey of technology as a replacement for human agency itself. The evidence for this turn is obvious enough, with the development of new surveillance methods to predict human behavior via the algorithm.

As for the culprit, Heidegger never named names, nor did Ellul or Ted. They have somewhat concluded that this is an all-implicating and an all-consuming enterprise, where everyone is both the victim and the perpetrator. The managerial state, if viewed through these lenses, is just a

symptom, and not a bug. Deconstructing or deprogramming will be of little consequence, as these forces are already outside at least of any human endeavor; for it has been running on autopilot for a century or two. The journey of this vision of technology is therefore resistant to any reforms in its schema, nor can it be halted. We can only observe it accelerating, and try our best to respond to it. Even the elites who know its ways and means are detached from its levers; it can only extract the copper wires at this point, and not much else.

It is therefore understandable to viciously oppose this reading, and have a natural stimulus of trying to refute its assertions. I do claim however, that this understanding is essential if we are to retrace our steps for achieving genuine human flourishing, if the cards are laid out at the right place and at the right opportunity. The realization of our technology as naturally entropic becomes a task of overcoming that entropy. Every civilizational system uses its technology in distinct and particular methods, either in harmony or in discord with its environment. The anthropologist Joseph Tainter, in his *The Collapse of Complex Societies*, perused through this question through historical case studies. While we can never be quite certain if this is accurate, its contents are in line with much of the evidence in store: that civilizations tend to develop intricate bureaucracies in line with their necessity of maximizing their technological efficiency in correlation with the availability of materials. What Rome, the Mauryans, the Mayans and the Greeks have in common is that their structures tend to be aligned with their energy consumption; their conquests and their innovations are often a consequence of the altered landscapes that they are into.

More recently, David Graeber argued in *The Dawn of Everything* that there is indeed no smooth stages of evolution nor approximations. While we can doubt the agenda and the fact that this is the default in many specialized anthropology courses, he convincingly presented the case that for much of prehistory, varied social organizations have existed, though most are of the hunter-gatherer peoples/tribes. These groups are charac-

terized by periodic fragmentation to small bands and their coherence into a temporary settlement wherein they will distribute the loot, with the excesses immediately put into use, or destroyed in symbolic rituals. This act meant that no surplus can be rendered permanent, and that the roles and obligations of a collective are to remain horizontal. As late as the 19th century and beyond, these patterns of behavior are still evident; hierarchies do exist, but as provisional measures that can be mended or folded by circumstances.

The rise of agrarian societies would then correlate with the need of capturing the technology of the former hunter-gatherers into a consistent paradigm and practice. Still, instances of consensus driven governance and decisions have persisted as far as 9,000 years ago. This supposed default of many homo sapiens would be strained and severed in responses to climate degradations; in some locales, people simply moved out; in others, the constant rote of life has led to the subjects in those clans or confederations to merge into more centralized and vertical arrangements, concentrated in oligarchies or monarchies, with the management and imposition of coercion as their primary means to gain acceptance; the Egyptian pharaohs for instance, had their legitimacy affixed to the fortunes of the River Nile, and so did the Balinese chiefs with their trading outposts. It is also not strange that in this very ground, the seeds of currency as tools would begin to cohere, and with it, the questions of ethics, most specifically of justice or the endowment of desserts to a person or a group.

This loss of human variety is unconsciously echoed by Ted, and we must grudgingly come to terms with its significance. Rather than just an act of shitposting, the industrial revolution is indeed a harbinger of disasters upon mankind. But he does not extend this further, perhaps due to his pre-existing mental imbalances or some other factors that we may neither know or care. Not only was the industrial revolution a disaster, modernity by its very extension is a disaster, since this would be responsible for the dissolution of whatever bonds that have persisted unmolested from family

to family, from generation to generation.

The process of modernity, which first reared its ugly head on the ruins of Europe in the Great Plague, is the accelerator to a train with little to no breaks. The social roles and mores, understood as customs, were put in strain. It is therefore not surprising that the managerial state, so endemic today in our institutions, both public and private, will have its first application in military terms. The diminishing role of the cavalry was made possible with the advent of more sophisticated artillery pieces, the same guns that either made castles adapt to its ways or outrightly demolished. The ideological visions of Liberalism, Socialism, Fascism, Nationalism and Anarchism would culminate in a reign of blood and uncertainty. And when Ted ruminated about these legacies, he is answering to the misguided euphoria and utopianism that characterized these frameworks. For ideology is not just a buffet on a platter; it is the very language, the very technology and the very eyes that we make sense of our reality as it has been set ablaze to make way for its place.

With these realizations, what is to be done? Before we even ask that 69 million-dollar question, we have to remove the splinters impeding our sight. Here are some of the parting observations in my part.

I will claim, as a matter of provocation, that only a few hold 'coherent' political views in this contemporary day and age. Most are cultural manners or aesthetic preferences. And it is nobody's fault really. The neo-liberal reforms from the top over the past 30-40 years, which included a preference for management over direct action (for it is beneficial to the functioning of a consumer economy with the credit-debt cycle as its fulcrum), have punctured the role of 'the state' so much that we hardly noticed it. It can explain why our relationship to the government is more negative than positive as a consequence (this is a global phenomenon as well, not just locally; though nations with strong community ties or organized labor are able to resist this effectively).

If we are political (in the modern sense of the word), we then subscribe

to these 2 aspects below, and this sentiment was dominant for much of the late 19th to the 20th centuries, until its implosion in the late 70s and the entirety of the 80s:

That politics follows a template of tradition to a party or a group (aka their history as background), and: That you are assured that the entity you adhere will take care of the distribution of resources and give you a piece of it.

Today's current setup is bereft of the two, since if we are going to somewhat accept that Francis Fukuyama is correct, we are living in an epoch where history has ended, liberal democracy is the only path and that there is no alternative (until very recently). It is therefore in this scenario where the 'politics' that we claim to espouse is not that different from fandom, and the discourse, both offline and online, is specifically designed to give you hysteria, as bad faith argumentation is everywhere, and you are always put on the defense.

Therefore, nothing except your sanity changes. We are thus trapped in this matrix and stuck in Plato's cave. It is not that far to even conclude that this is why everyone is panicking like headless chickens, for this is something that operates in our subconscious, whether we like it or not. If this premise of mine is perhaps grounded and cogent, this can somewhat explain the prevalence of cancel culture, initially in the evangelicals who are angry about He-Man being 'satanic', and then it got transferred to the liberals and their constant policing of language.

Realizing this may give us some clarity. Absent a class project if you are a socialist or a collective vision of anything (for everybody else) since we are living in spiritually impoverished times, every 'advocacy' that we hold so dearly becomes sterile and impotent, absorbed and coopted by a system engineered to do it. And so long as this is the case, it is not that surprising that we are just reckoning with the implications of this process and its effects in our social fabric.

In short, recognizing this process, this very contemporary process is

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integral to the objectives that we want to accomplish, if we really want to square the circle. Ted's contribution to this revival of interest must not be underestimated. Modernity has been the apocalypse; we must push through it, and out of it, if we really want to live.